原文出於NY TIMES
This is the way the euro ends — not with a bang but with bunga bunga. Not long ago, European leaders were insisting that Greece could and should stay on the euro while paying its debts in full. Now, with Italy falling off a cliff, it’s hard to see how the euro can survive at all.
歐元就是這樣終結的──不是轟然一聲結束，而是在領導人與眾多紅粉佳人的性醜聞下落幕。不久之前歐洲領導人還在堅持希臘會還清所有債務，所以希臘可以，而且也應該繼續留在歐元區。如今義大利也跌落深淵，實在看不出歐元還有一絲維持機會。
But what’s the meaning of the eurodebacle? As always happens when disaster strikes, there’s a rush by ideologues to claim that the disaster vindicates their views. So it’s time to start debunking.
然而歐元崩解意味著什麼？每當災難來臨，總是有群理論家會跳出來，聲稱這場災難證明了他們的觀點。是時候該揭穿真相了。
First things first: The attempt to create a common European currency was one of those ideas that cut across the usual ideological lines. It was cheered on by American right-wingers, who saw it as the next best thing to a revived gold standard, and by Britain’s left, which saw it as a big step toward a social-democratic Europe. But it was opposed by British conservatives, who also saw it as a step toward a social-democratic Europe. And it was questioned by American liberals, who worried — rightly, I’d say (but then I would, wouldn’t I?) — about what would happen if countries couldn’t use monetary and fiscal policy to fight recessions.
首先，試圖創造歐洲通用貨幣的構想已經超越了以往意識形態的分界。美國右派對此大為鼓勵，認為是僅次於回復金本位制外最好的想法；英國左派歡欣鼓舞，這是邁向社會民主主義歐洲的一大步。不過英國保守派抱持反對態度，因為也把此舉視為邁向社會民主主義歐洲的一大步；至於美國自由派亦提出質疑，擔憂──我會說擔憂的對(我的確是說了，不是嗎？) 如果國家不能使用貨幣與財政政策對抗不景氣該怎麼辦。
So now that the euro project is on the rocks, what lessons should we draw?
現在歐元方案瀕臨瓦解，我們從中學到了什麼教訓？
I’ve been hearing two claims, both false: that Europe’s woes reflect the failure of welfare states in general, and that Europe’s crisis makes the case for immediate fiscal austerity in the United States.
我聽過兩種說法，全部都是錯的。一個是說歐洲的災難反應福利國家的失敗，另一個說歐洲危機要美國立刻實施財政緊縮政策。
The assertion that Europe’s crisis proves that the welfare state doesn’t work comes from many Republicans. For example, Mitt Romney has accused President Obama of taking his inspiration from European “socialist democrats” and asserted that “Europe isn’t working in Europe.” The idea, presumably, is that the crisis countries are in trouble because they’re groaning under the burden of high government spending. But the facts say otherwise.
斷定歐洲危機證實福利國家會失敗主要來自共和黨人，比如說羅尼指控歐巴馬總統是受到歐洲「社會民主主義」所啟發，又聲稱「歐洲模式連在歐洲都沒有用。」其論述大概是身陷危機的國家，都被龐大的政府支出壓得喘不過氣。不過事實卻不是如此。
It’s true that all European countries have more generous social benefits — including universal health care — and higher government spending than America does. But the nations now in crisis don’t have bigger welfare states than the nations doing well — if anything, the correlation runs the other way. Sweden, with its famously high benefits, is a star performer, one of the few countries whose G.D.P. is now higher than it was before the crisis. Meanwhile, before the crisis, “social expenditure” — spending on welfare-state programs — was lower, as a percentage of national income, in all of the nations now in trouble than in Germany, let alone Sweden.
歐洲國家都有相當優渥的社會津貼──包含了全民健保，而且政府支出高於美國政府也是事實，但遭遇危機的國家並沒有比其他表現良好的國家有更高的津貼。真要說的話，關連性還完全相反。瑞典一向以高福利聞名，目前的表現卻非常耀眼，是少數幾個GDP比金融危機前還高的國家。此外陷入麻煩的國家在危機前，其社福支出(就是福利方案的支出)所占歲收比例還比德國低，更別提瑞典了。
Oh, and Canada, which has universal health care and much more generous aid to the poor than the United States, has weathered the crisis better than we have.
喔，還有加拿大，他們也有全民健保和比起美國更優渥的貧困補助，卻也比我們更順利的度過危機。
The euro crisis, then, says nothing about the sustainability of the welfare state. But does it make the case for belt-tightening in a depressed economy?
所以歐洲危機跟福利國家是否能持續毫無關係，但是否意味著經濟蕭條時要勒緊褲帶呢？
You hear that claim all the time. America, we’re told, had better slash spending right away or we’ll end up like Greece or Italy. Again, however, the facts tell a different story.
無時無刻都會聽到這種主張，說美國最好馬上大砍支出，或則會落得和希臘與義大利一樣的下場。然而再一次，事實不是這樣。
First, if you look around the world you see that the big determining factor for interest rates isn’t the level of government debt but whether a government borrows in its own currency. Japan is much more deeply in debt than Italy, but the interest rate on long-term Japanese bonds is only about 1 percent to Italy’s 7 percent. Britain’s fiscal prospects look worse than Spain’s, but Britain can borrow at just a bit over 2 percent, while Spain is paying almost 6 percent.
首先若環顧一下整個世界，會發現決定利率高低的巨大因素不是政府債務的等級，而是政府借了多少內債。日本的債務遠高於義大利，但日本長期國債的利率只有1%，而義大利是7%。英國的財政遠景看來比西班牙糟，可是英國借貸利率只高過2%一點點，西班牙卻幾乎到6%。
What has happened, it turns out, is that by going on the euro, Spain and Italy in effect reduced themselves to the status of third-world countries that have to borrow in someone else’s currency, with all the loss of flexibility that implies. In particular, since euro-area countries can’t print money even in an emergency, they’re subject to funding disruptions in a way that nations that kept their own currencies aren’t — and the result is what you see right now. America, which borrows in dollars, doesn’t have that problem.
結果證明由於採用歐元，西班牙和義大利等於把自己降到第三世界國家的水準，必須要借入他國的貨幣，喪失了貨幣彈性。此外歐元區國家連面臨危機也無法加印貨幣，因此受困於資金中斷，這是擁有自己貨幣的國家不會發生的，其結果就如現在所見。而美國是以美金借入，所以沒有此問題。
The other thing you need to know is that in the face of the current crisis, austerity has been a failure everywhere it has been tried: no country with significant debts has managed to slash its way back into the good graces of the financial markets. For example, Ireland is the good boy of Europe, having responded to its debt problems with savage austerity that has driven its unemployment rate to 14 percent. Yet the interest rate on Irish bonds is still above 8 percent — worse than Italy.
在目前危機當中還要知道一件事，就是所有嘗試財政緊縮的國家都失敗了：沒有一個有顯著負債的國家可以在大砍赤字後，回復了以往金融市場上的優雅身影。以愛爾蘭為例，愛爾蘭是歐洲的乖孩子，負責的以緊縮政策讓失業率飆到14%來處理債務問題，可是愛爾蘭國債利率還是超過8%，比義大利還高。
The moral of the story, then, is to beware of ideologues who are trying to hijack the European crisis on behalf of their agendas. If we listen to those ideologues, all we’ll end up doing is making our own problems — which are different from Europe’s, but arguably just as severe — even worse.
整件事的教訓，是小心那些為了自己利益方針試圖挾持歐洲危機的理論家。如果真的聽進了他們的理論，結果只會製造自己的麻煩──一個跟歐洲不同，但可能一樣嚴重甚至更糟糕的麻煩。
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