[MLB] 2011運動家改頭換面，但還是不夠

原文出自奧克蘭運動家官網

【奧克蘭報導】 對運動家隊來說，2011年並不如原先盼望的是個充滿競爭力的一年，而是球員都沒有打出預期成績，最終連續五年都勝少敗多的球季。

 

儘管運動家為了提升進攻火力，迎來威靈漢(Josh Willingham)、迪黑蘇斯(David DeJesus)、有名的日本大砲松井秀喜(Hideki Matsui)，還吹噓說擁有最佳年輕投手群，但不論是投打都面臨不穩定還有傷兵的窘境，只以74勝88敗美聯西區第三名的成績作收。

 

經歷了這一切，球隊還忍受了教練的更動。格林(Bob Geren)打出了27勝36敗的戰績後遭撤換，梅爾文(Bob Melvin)從6月9日起擔任總教練，之後戰績是47勝52敗，此外場上還有許多來來去去的交易。

 

到了6月，開幕戰先發內野陣容僅存游擊手裴寧頓(Cliff Pennington)一人，而休季才剛開始，外野就有三個大洞待補。這些戰力空缺預計會在2012年由年輕球員補上，目前看來運動家的重建路上痛苦要比勝利來的多。

 

球隊在2011年承受了許多大起大落，耐心再一次成為奧克蘭的信條。以下簡單帶出今年球季五大事件。

 

5‧傷兵，更多的傷兵

 

儘管因為2010年的傷兵困擾而大幅改組防護員，2011年運動家全隊還是遇上了眾多傷勢並付出慘痛代價。早在今年球季初期，先發投手布雷登(Dallas Braden)和安德森(Brett Anderson)就受傷開刀整季報銷，其他重要球員如貝利(Andrew Bailey)出賽53場、哈登(Rich Harden)出賽82場、麥卡錫(Brandon McCarthy)出賽41場、渥茲(Michael Wuertz)出賽53場都缺席了很長的時間。傷兵缺席，先發投手卡西爾(Trevor Cahill)和2011全明星的岡薩雷茲(Gio Gonzalez)表現也不穩定，種種因素綜合起來造成很大的傷害。本來投手防禦率在美聯領先(3.13)，明星賽後卻一路滑落到4.48。

 

4‧「魔球」引來全國目光

 

雖然又是個忘掉也好的球季，9月運動家卻成為全國的焦點。2002年球隊的故事登上大螢幕，長久以來備受期待的「魔球」終於上映了。運動家總經理比恩(Billy Beane)由布萊德彼特飾演，片中布萊德彼特精準的詮釋了比恩獨特的行事作風，還有如何以小資本成為一隻常勝軍更拿下20連勝，電影給奧克蘭帶來積極共鳴。布萊德彼特、其他好萊屋明星希爾(Jonah Hill)、普拉特(Chris Pratt)、導演米勒(Bennett Miller)以及其他明星一同出席了奧克蘭的首映會，走上紅地毯(其實是綠色的)。比恩，梅爾文還有大部分運動家球員也都出席了首映活動。

 

3‧二壘的更動

 

對運動家的球迷來說，今年恐怕沒有比6月30日更讓人苦樂參半的一天。這一天長期受到球迷喜愛，表現出色的二壘手艾利斯(Mark Ellis)被交易到洛磯隊，表示明日之星、新秀衛柯斯(Jemile Weeks)正式接管二壘。艾利斯留下了隊史二壘手出賽最多的紀錄(1021場)，而他對運動家的衷心也得到比恩的回報。這次交易比恩沒有大搶特搶，只拿到一名右投中繼畢林茲(Bruce Billings)，還給洛磯隊一些現金補償艾利斯的薪水，同時讓艾利斯有機會在別隊天天出賽。數週過去了，新出頭的聯盟新星快速撫平球迷的難過，在朦朧不清的未來裡，球迷起碼還有個亮點可以關注。

 

2‧撤換格林，迎來梅爾文

 

25年來運動家第一次在季中更換教練，由於前任還有現任球員的公開批評，格林在6月9日的9連敗後遭到撤換。此舉等於公開表示，球隊明明充滿競爭力卻缺乏該有的信心，因此必須要做點改革，就算改革的代價是比恩好友格林。梅爾文被任命為臨時總教練，他很快的就為這支步履蹣跚的球隊注入新的活力還有自信，下半季戰績走紅。9月21日梅爾文的努力有了回報，得到一紙三年合約，確定他會執教到2014年。

 

1‧運動家進入重建

 

早在運動家結束失望的2011球季前，球隊要重建的流言閩語就沒停歇過，而球隊今年冬天的幾起決策更是間接証實流言。奧克蘭完全不競逐隊上成為自由球員的選手，如威靈漢已轉往明尼蘇達，同時球團也傳出財務狀況不明，導致球場問題懸而未解，維護預算遲遲沒有下文。儘管如此，比恩還是希望球場問題儘早解決，然後球隊如2007年季後般重新換血。冬季會議後不久，運動家的總經理就開始策動交易，打包明星球員卡西爾和岡薩雷茲。岡薩雷茲交易至華盛頓換回四名新秀，隨後又交易布雷斯洛至亞利桑那換來三名球員，球隊因此獲得七名優質潛力新秀。

[克魯曼專欄] Springtime for Toxics 毒物之春 原文載於(2011/12/26)

原文出於NY Times 



我的聖誕願望：讓我們更健康更富有。是說我都已經許願了，怎麼不順便許願希望美國人也能更聰明呢？


大驚喜：我的願望實現了，環境保護署已經針對發電廠的汞和有毒氣體排放設立新標準。規範實在是姍姍來遲，我們早該在20年前就開始管制汞。不過如今終於設立了規範，花費些許的成本就能贏得巨大的利益。


理所當然的，共和黨人對此怒氣衝天。然而在談政治之前，先來談談環保局做了什麼益事。


就我所知，就連反對環境管制的人，都承認汞是非常可怕的東西。汞是強力的神經毒素：有個片語「如製帽工人般瘋狂」出現在19世紀，因為當時製帽工人用汞的化合物來處理毛皮，結果飽受神經還有智力受損之苦。


如今製帽工人不再使用汞(是說現在誰還帶帽子呢？)，可是大量的汞卻散布到大氣中，因為很多老舊燃煤發電廠缺乏現代的汙染防治。汞從空氣進入水中後，微生物將其轉化為甲基汞，在魚體內累積。然後會怎樣呢？環保局解釋說「孕婦、胎兒、幼兒要特別注意甲基汞的暴露，研究顯示高量的甲基汞會損害神經系統發展，進而影響孩童的思考及學習能力。」


聽起來像該管制的東西，不是嗎？


新規範也會減少細懸浮微粒汙染，細懸浮微粒會引起許多疾病，如氣喘和心臟病。事實上減少細懸浮微粒汙染的好處，佔了新規範所帶來的利益量化後的絕大部分。這句的關鍵詞是「量化」。環保署針對汞的管制，在成本效益分析只考量到一個好處，就是孩童吃了岸邊垂釣者釣來的淡水魚後，將來智力受損會損失掉多少工資。減少汞排放毫無疑問的還有許多好處，不過環保局不知道該怎麼把這些好處轉化為金錢衡量。


儘管如此，新規範的收益非常高：一年足足會增加900億的收益，相較下因為電價微升，支出會大約多100億而已。正如Grist雜誌(譯註：美國自由派的非營利免費線上雜誌，主要出版環保新聞)的羅伯斯(David Roberts)所說，這是非常划算的交易。


同時也是共和黨人亟欲除之而後快的交易。


最近美國政壇許多事紛紛擾擾，因此共和黨的激進反環保行為沒有獲得太多注目，可是在這方面確實發生了值得關注的事。才幾年前，同時身為共和黨內有頭有臉的人士與環保人士是有可能的。2008年選戰馬侃(John McCain)警告全球暖化的風險，同時還針對碳排放提議碳交易系統。然而現在黨的路線成了絕對規避新環境管制，還要推翻所有已有的保護。


我可沒有誇大其辭。就像時代雜誌報導的，先前兩黨在舉債上限的爭鬥中，共和黨試圖加上附加條款，不讓環保署和內政部運作。


哦，順便一提，你可能聽過有報導說洪博培(Jon Huntsman)並不一樣，而且他確實說過「保護自然是保守主張，我也從不以身為保育份子為恥。」算了吧，就像畢凱艦長被博格人同化，他也已經被反環保份子同化了，宣稱環保署「用恐懼來管制支配」，還預測新規範會在明年夏天造成缺電。考量到那時規範都還沒開始生效，這預測倒是挺厲害的。


大致上不管你聽到什麼可怕的預測，說管制污染會造成某些後果，都要知道背後一定有特殊利益，而且這種預測都是大錯特錯。例如電力公司聲稱酸雨的規範會擾亂電力供應，導致費率飆升，但現實就是並沒有發生。而酸雨的計畫也成了絕佳範例，示範環境保護與經濟成長也可以和平共存。


但再次提醒別管共和黨那套，去盲目反對所謂「摧毀就業」的管制。而我也不得不承認這件事多少影響了我的心情，環保署才剛完成一樁好事，但只要共和黨贏了明年的選戰，不管是誰代表參選，都一定會試圖推翻這項決策。


不過至少目前來說，只要是在乎同胞的健康，特別是國家下一代的人，都該對此額手稱慶。

[克魯曼專欄] The Post-Truth Campaign 沒真相的選戰 原文載於(2011/12/23)

原文出於NY Times 

假設歐巴馬總統發表以下言論：「羅姆尼(Mitt Romney)認為企業也是人，而唯有企業以及有錢人才能享有權利。羅姆尼希望把美國中產階級貶為農奴，不管企業選擇開出的薪水有多低，勞工都必須照單全收。」

 

有誰會接受這一聲明呢？我相信不論是自由派或是保守派，都幾乎會共同發出譴責，我也希望如此。羅姆尼是曾經說過企業也算是人，但不是字面上的那個意思；他支持的政策是對企業和富人有益，對中產階級有害，但與他要引入封建制度也實在差了十萬八千里。

 

然而現在來想想羅姆尼週二確實說過的話：「歐巴馬總統認為，政府應當要讓所有的結果平等。在這種不勞而獲的社會裡，不管你的教育程度，也不管你有沒有努力付出或是願不願意冒險，每個人都得到的回報不是一模一樣，就是相差無幾。也就是有些人的報酬，是來自分配其他人所賺來的。」

 

而在在同一天接受採訪時，羅姆尼先生宣稱總統「要把自由企業移送法辦。」

 

這番言論跟我假想的歐巴馬聲明一樣糟糕透頂。歐巴馬從來沒有發表過任何言論暗示自己有這種想法，事實上他還努力表揚自由企業，說追求致富並沒有問題。歐巴馬的實質施政建議是包含了對高收入美國人加稅，但也只是回到1990年代的水準。而且不管前麻州州長如何否認，平價醫療法(Affordable Care Act)所建立的醫療體系，本質就跟2006年他自己在州內建立的體系一樣。

 

不管怎麼看，歐巴馬對經濟政策的建議，都跟溫和共和黨人曾經支持的差不多。然而羅姆尼口中的總統像是卡斯楚再臨，而且他似乎挺有信心，認為自己不會為了信口雌黃付出代價。

 

歡迎來到沒真相的政治世界。

 

為什麼羅姆尼先生認為自己可以脫身？這個嘛，因為他已經同樣造謠抹黑別人很多次了，也都成功脫身。事實上他整體選戰策略的基調就是攻擊歐巴馬總統，把總統施政和理念白的說成黑的，黑的說成白的。

 

例如10月羅姆尼承諾若當選總統，「我會推翻歐巴馬總統大幅刪減國防預算的決定。」這番話想必引起共和黨聽眾廣大共鳴，但他到底在說什麼？歐巴馬上任以來國防預算依然穩步增加。

 

再來羅姆尼不斷暗示總統跑遍世界，「替美國向大家道歉」。這在右派是很常見的主題，但所謂「歐巴馬道歉之旅」徹頭徹尾是無中生有，斷章取義。

 

正如華盛頓郵報的薩金特(Greg Sargent)所指出，羅姆尼的謊話連篇還有一些言論都有個共通主題，策略就是要把總統塑造成可疑的人，並不相信美國的價值。而既然歐巴馬總統沉默以對，不對這類指控自清，羅姆尼乾脆自己創造些東西出來支持自己的論點。

 

但難道不會有反彈嗎？羅姆尼說謊抹黑的選戰基調不會付出代價嗎？顯然他認定不會，而且恐怕他是對的。

 

喔，羅姆尼或許會因為其中一些謊言而引起注意。但是若照過去的經驗，大多新聞媒體會感到要「平衡」報導，意味每當媒體指出共和黨說謊，同時就要報導另一篇指控民主黨說謊的案例來對比，就算民主黨所言無誤。如果民主黨有些許失言甚至會更糟。

 

這可不是什麼抽象思辨。「政治現實」(譯註：聖彼得堡時報旗下的網站)本該是強化政治真相透明度的方案，卻宣稱民主黨指稱共和黨要投票終結聯邦醫療保險是「年度最大謊言」。但這本來就是事實，雖然我們都知道共和黨的確投票廢除聯邦醫療保險，替換成憑證方案後繼續保留原名，但也只有名字跟以前一樣而已，而且不保證能繼續負擔保險。

 

所以我在此預測明年：如果羅姆尼真的成為共和黨總統候選人，屆時針對歐巴馬總統的抹黑會鋪天蓋地而來，有時候還會做成廣告來宣傳。然而新聞機構報導時會基於補償，也會提出另一方的過錯。舉個例吧，總統主張所得最高百分之1的人是錯的，他多算了百分之1或2。

 

最終打這種徹底抹黑的選戰，不會受到任何實質懲罰。就像我所說，歡迎來到沒真相的政治世界。

[克魯曼專欄] Will China Break? 中國經濟要垮了嗎？ 原文載於(2011/12/19)

原文出於NY Times 



試想一下以下情景：近來的經濟成長都是靠著房地產價格飆升，進而掀起建設狂潮所推動的，而且出現了所有泡沫的典型徵兆。信貸也快速增長，不過不是增長在傳統銀行，而是不受政府監督，也沒有政府在背後背書的「影子銀行」。現在泡沫破滅，金融還有經濟危機的噩夢可能會成真。

我是在描述1980年代的日本？還是2007年的美國？都有可能。不過我其實是在說現在的中國，中國有可能會成為世界經濟的另一處危機焦點，而這正是我們現在最~不想發生的事。

我一直不怎麼想去衡量中國的情勢，部分原因是很難確認到底真正發生了什麼事。所有經濟數據看起來，了不起都像是某種古怪又無聊的科幻小說，但中國的數據卻又看來特別假。我曾諮詢過幾位道地的中國專家，結果每一位專家的說法都不一樣。

然而即便如此，如今就連官方的數據都令人憂心，而最近的消息也夠引人注意，是時候敲響警鐘了。

過去十年來，中國經濟最引人注目的就是家庭消費儘管有增加，卻仍落後於總體成長。消費支出只佔國內生產毛額(G.D.P.)的百分之35，大約是美國一半的水準。

那是誰在購買中國的商品與服務？嗯，一部分的答案正是我們自己。正當消費者共同分擔衰退的經濟時，中國越來越依賴貿易順差，來支撐其製造業不被拖下水。然而從中國的角度來看，更重要的情形是投資支出已經攀升到將近G.D.P.的一半。

有個很明顯的問題，就是既然消費需求相對較弱，那是什麼促進了投資呢？答案是其中很重要的一部分，是來自持續膨脹的房地產泡沫。從2000年以來，房地產投資所佔的G.D.P.比重已經幾乎加倍，直接佔了總體投資成長的一半以上。而其他增長肯定大多是來自於迅速成長的營建業，買下其他擴展中的公司。

我們確實知道房地產已經是個泡沫了嗎？有種種的跡象表明如此，不單單只是上揚的價格，還有類似我們前幾年經歷過的那種投機狂熱。想想看佛羅里達海岸。

還有另一個與美國經驗類似之處，就是信貸的蓬勃發展。其中很大一部分不是來自銀行，而是不受監督、也沒有保護的影子銀行體系。不過細節上有很大的不同。美國的影子銀行體系通常與著名的華爾街企業，複雜的金融商品有關；中國的影子銀行體系則往往牽涉地下錢莊甚至當鋪。然而後果都非常雷同，中國正如幾年前的美國，金融體系可能要比傳統銀行顯示的數據要更為脆弱。

現在泡沫很明顯的破了。會對中國經濟，還有世界經濟造成多大傷害？

有些評論家說不必擔心，中國已經壯大了，聰明的領導人會盡一切努力妥善處理衰退。隱藏在其中，不太會明說的想法就是中國可以盡其所能，因為中國不需要去擔憂民主這類小事。

然而對我來說，這些論點跟過去著名的結論聽起來一模一樣。畢竟我記得很清楚，1980年代的日本也有類似的保證，說睿智的財政部官僚理當控制得宜。還有之後美國也有保證，說美國絕對永遠不會重蹈日本失落的十年覆轍，結果實際上我們處理得比日本還糟糕。

先不論其價值，我不覺得中國官員的經濟政策報告條理分明。特別是中國嚴厲斥責外國人，可不像是明白自己在做什麼的成熟政府。除此之外，對美國產汽車開徵懲罰性關稅對經濟無益，只會毒害彼此的貿易關係。

另外還有傳聞表明，中國政府雖不受法律約束，卻受無孔不入的貪腐掣肘，意味著北京所下的命令，在地方層級實行情形可能大不相同。

我希望我只是在杞人憂天，但不可能不去擔憂。中國的情況太像我們已在其他地方見過的崩壞，而歐洲的混亂已經讓世界經濟受創夠深了，真的、真的不需要另一處新危機的引爆點。

[克魯曼專欄] G.O.P. Monetary Madness 共和黨的貨幣狂想 原文載於(2011/12/16)

原文出於NY Times

顯然共和黨到現在都還在想破頭，努力找出羅姆尼(Willard M. Romney)以外的提名人。至少根據愛荷華州最新的民意調查，羅姆尼已經超越金瑞契(Newt Gingrich)。下一位：保羅(Ron Paul)眾議員。

某方面來說也挺有道理的，大家確實不太相信羅姆尼，認為他立場搖擺不定，只要對自己的事業有益就行。羅姆尼不斷面對這類指控，因為這本來就是事實。相反的，保羅立場始終一致。我敢打賭，就算去找保羅幾年前的影片，也絕對不會找到與現在言行不一之處。

保羅是很堅定立場，但很不幸的是他的立場忽略現實，即便事實證明他的理念有錯，依然對此深信不疑。更不幸的是，儘管共和黨曾經更了解現實世界，但如今保羅的理念成了全體共和黨的共識。

我不是在說保羅的反戰論點，也不是在說他對民權和生育權的看法，雖然後兩者較鮮為人知，而且會嚇壞以為他是好人的自由派人士。取而代之，我是在說他對經濟學的看法。

保羅自認是「奧地利經濟學派」的信徒，而奧地利學派別說是凱因斯(John Maynard Keynes)，就連傅利曼(Milton Friedman)都強烈反對其主張。奧地利學派支持者眼中的法定貨幣，也就是錢，只不過是背後沒有黃金擔保的印刷品罷了，更是所有經濟罪惡之源。因此雖然傅利曼聲稱貨幣擴張可以避免大蕭條，而柏南克(Ben Bernanke)目前也實行此項政策，奧地利學派支持者還是堅決反對任何貨幣擴張，。

好吧，先離題一下：聯邦準備理事會並沒有真正在印鈔票，那是財政部負責的。不過聯準會負責控制「準備貨幣」，也就是銀行準備金還有流通中的貨幣總額。所以當大家談到柏南克在印鈔票時，其實是說聯準會擴增了準備貨幣。

而目前的確大幅擴增了準備貨幣。自從雷曼兄弟倒閉後，聯準會大量放款給銀行，同時購入各類資產，希望透過提升銀行準備金來穩定金融市場，而聯準會也成功了。2010年秋季，聯準會又進行另一波收購試圖刺激經濟成長，這一次就沒那麼成功。這些行動的效果綜合起來，就是目前準備貨幣是以往的三倍之多。

奧地利學派以及許多右傾的經濟學家，都非常肯定這會導致一種後果：毀滅性的通貨膨脹。有位著名的奧地利學派評論家席夫(Peter Schiff)是保羅的諮詢顧問，他甚至還在電視上警告，不久可能會發生辛巴威式的超級通膨。

讓我們來到三年後，情況到底如何呢？通貨膨脹率有所波動，然而到當天結束為止，消費物價只上漲了百分之4.5，表示每年只平均上漲了百分之1.5。誰能預測印了這麼多鈔票，卻只造成一點點的通膨呢？嗯，正是在下，也的確預測了。還有能了解被保羅痛斥的凱因斯經濟學的人，也都能預測。不過保羅的支持者還是聲稱，無論如何保羅都是對的。

保羅的最初支持者絕不會承認自己錯了，而我的經驗是政治世界裡，決不會有人承認自己在任何事上犯過錯。讀者可能會認為，如果奧地利學派的信念核心錯得那麼離譜，就算是在共和黨內奧地利學派也不會受歡迎。畢竟沒多久前的布希執政年頭，遇上經濟不景氣，很多共和黨人也支持印鈔救市。2004年的總統經濟報告中稱「積極貨幣政策可以降低蕭條程度。」

然而事情並沒有這樣發展，掌握全黨的反而是緊縮貨幣學說還有通膨妄想，儘管通膨預測持續下降已經成真。舉例來說，莫名其妙突然成為黨內經濟沉思者的眾議員萊恩(Paul Ryan)，在2月時談到柏南克是如何「貶值」貨幣，他又高談闊論指出2010年尾和2011年初物價上升，這是通膨終於要到來的證據。從那之後物價直落，可是也看不出萊恩或其他人改變想法。

保羅目前看來還不太可能成為總統，但就如我所說，雖然有種種事件證明他的理論完全錯誤，保羅的經濟理論還是正式成為共和黨理念。而如果該理論真的付諸實行，最後會發生什麼事呢？大蕭條，我們來囉。

[克魯曼專欄] Depression and Democracy 經濟蕭條，民主倒車 原文載於(2011/12/12)

原文出於NY Times



原文出於NY Times



時候到了，該稱呼目前的現況為蕭條了。沒錯，現在還不算是以往大蕭條捲土重來，但也只能拿這點來聊以慰藉罷了。美國和歐洲的失業率都高的嚇人，而領導人與各機構的聲望都持續下滑，連民主價值如今都岌岌可危。


民主動搖這點我並不是在危言聳聽。不論是政治還是經濟，絕不可落入所謂「沒那麼糟」的陷阱裡。不是現在的高失業率沒有1933年時那麼高，所以就還可以接受；也不是因為目前還沒有出現希特勒，所以就無視於政治趨勢上種種不祥預兆。


我特別要討論歐洲，倒不是美國一切都很好，而是大家都還不太了解目前歐洲政治發展的嚴重性。首先是歐元的危機，已經逐漸扼殺歐洲統合的夢想。本來藉由共享貨幣，各國終究會合而為一，如今氣氛卻轉為尖銳的對立。


特別是強力要求極其嚴苛的財政緊縮，卻又對如何補償經濟成長這點不理不睬，造成了經濟的雙重傷害。經濟政策徹底失敗，不僅讓失業情況更加惡化，也沒有恢復市場信心。即使目前的金融危機得到控制，也還是很有可能發生蔓延全歐洲的蕭條。而失敗的經濟政策激起廣大民怨，不管公不公平(實際上兩者皆有)，很多歐洲人都倍感憤怒，覺得德國在粗暴的行使權力。


任何熟悉歐洲歷史的人，見到這種再度復甦的敵意都會忍不住顫抖，不過事情有可能會更糟。


右翼民粹主義者四處崛起，如領導人曾和新納粹有關連的奧地利自由黨，在民調中與其他政黨的支持度不分軒輊；還有反移民的正統芬蘭人黨，在去年四月選舉表現亮眼。而且這些富裕國家的經濟都維持得很好，事情在較貧窮的中歐與東歐國家看來只會更加糟糕。


上個月歐洲復興開發銀行提出文件，顯示新歐盟成員國，也就是在柏林圍牆倒塌後才加入歐盟的國家，民眾對民主的支持度一落千丈(見連結)。對民主越沒信心的國家，毫不意外就是經濟受創越深的國家。


就在我們探討這件事時，至少有個國家民主體制正逐漸崩解，那就是匈牙利。


「更好匈牙利運動黨」是匈牙利的一個主要政黨，該黨簡直是從1930年代穿越來的惡夢：反吉普賽人，反猶太人，甚至還有準軍事武裝。然而眼前的威脅來自執政的中間偏右政黨，青年民主主義者聯盟。


青年民主主義者聯盟在去年一躍成為國會內壓倒性的多數黨，有部分是因為經濟的原因。匈牙利不屬於歐元區，但由於大舉外債，還有老實說，前任左翼自由派執政黨的管理不善與貪污，匈牙利經濟因此嚴重受創。去年春季起，青年民主主義者聯盟每通過一項黨內政策，就等於強行通過一條憲法，而且如今似乎打算要永久掌權。


細節部分相當複雜。謝普爾教授是普林斯頓大學的法律系和公共關係部主任，他已經密切觀注匈牙利的情況發展一段時間了，他跟我說青年民主主義者聯盟靠著各種緊密的手段壓制反對陣營。新擬的選舉法不正當的重劃選區，導致其他政黨機乎根本不可能組成政府；司法獨立性也被迫妥協，法院內盡是該黨忠誠支持者；國營媒體轉為政黨喉舌，獨立媒體受到打壓；甚至新擬憲法增訂條文，視主要左派政黨為非法組織。


綜合以上事例，整件事宛如要在歐洲的心臟地帶，以薄如紙的民主為包裹重建獨裁政權。而且這只不過是個範例，告訴我們若蕭條持續，各地有可能會發生什麼情形。


目前還不太清楚要如何處理匈牙利步向獨裁，值得稱讚的是美國國務院已經有了不少動作。然而說到底，這終究是歐洲自己的事務。歐盟已經錯失阻止奪權的先機，多少是因為當時歐盟輪值主席正好由匈牙利擔任，如今想要扭轉局勢顯得更難了。儘管如此，歐洲眾領導人最好放手一試，否則所有他們擁護和代表的一切都會付諸流水。


另外這群領導人最好反省他們失敗的經濟政策，若繼續堅持己見，更多地區的民主會大開倒車，屆時歐元破產只不過會是最枝微末節的問題而已。

[克魯曼專欄] All the G.O.P.’s Gekkos 共和黨的一群大亨 原文載於(2011/12/09)

原文出於NY Times

 

電影「華爾街」上映距今將近25個年頭過去了，如今電影比以往更加貼近現實。自以為是的金融大亨指責歐巴馬總統的論詞，聽起來就像電影角色蓋柯的著名演說「貪婪是美德」翻版。至於對占領華爾街行動的抱怨，聽起來也很像蓋柯私下說的「我根本沒有創造什麼，只是擁有罷了。」以及蓋柯對他的學徒說的「這下你還會天真到相信我們住在民主國家嗎，小夥子？」

 

 

不過事後來看，電影的結尾有點誇大了。電影的尾聲是在美國證券交易委員會的努力下，蓋柯終於鋃鐺入獄，罪有應得。現實的情況則是金融業權力不斷增大，所有負責管制規範的人都遭架空。

 

 

另外根據市場預測組織Intrade的估計，下一任共和黨總統參選提名人有百分之45的機會是現實生活中的蓋柯。

 

 

當然，我不是第一個察覺到羅姆尼(譯註：Mitt Romney，美國商人與政治家，曾任麻州州長。於2008年曾參與角逐共和黨總統候選提名人，但初選結果不理想而退出。)的商場生涯與奧利佛史東的反英雄影片有共通點，其實支持勞工的團體美國改革聯合組織(Americans United for Change)已經把「羅姆尼‧蓋柯」當成廣告戰略。然而整件事背後有更深的意涵，遠不只是抨擊與反對羅姆尼而已。

 

 

依照目前共和黨的說法，富人絕不可受批判，更別提要富人多繳稅，因為富人會「創造就業」。可是實際情況是如今許多富人的所作所為根本不會創造就業，相反的還會摧毀就業，而羅姆尼先生的商場生涯正好完美描繪了這幅情景。

 

 

洛杉磯時報前陣子調查貝恩資本公司的紀錄，該公司是家私人股權投資公司，羅姆尼從1984年起參與經營至1999年。報告中提到，羅姆尼在那些年替自己還有投資人大賺了一筆，可是使用的方法卻時常傷害到一般員工。

 

 

貝恩資本公司專門從事融資併購，經由融資借貸併購目標公司，再以目標公司的獲利或資產作為借貸抵押。這個策略的概念就是要增加目標公司的收益，隨後再加以賣出。

 

 

但收益是怎麼增加的？最為人所知的印象有部分是奧利佛史東創造的，就是藉由無情的削減成本來達成併購，而所謂成本通常指的是員工的人事成本，員工不是被裁員就是削減薪資與福利。儘管現實中的情況要更加複雜，甚至有公司在融資併購後還擴充與招募員工，但這個印象確實有部分是事實。不久前有份針對「私人股權投資交易」的分析報告，所謂私人股權投資交易就是貝恩資本公司專門從事的併購與接管，該報告指出這類融資併購大致上是同時創造與摧毀就業機會，而遭併購與接管的公司亦是如此。但是成為併購目標的公司，創造就業的能力遜色於相同類型卻不是併購目標的公司，而且「總體來說，摧毀的就業機會始終較多」。

 

 

因此綜觀結論，讓羅姆尼飛黃騰達的生意是建立在摧毀就業而非創造就業。即使融資併購讓公司收益和高階主管的收入增加，摧毀就業的結果就是傷害了一般勞工，造成的薪資停滯還有高階人員收入暴增成了美國自1980年來的特徵。

 

 

我認為融資併購這行業根本是就業毀滅者，那貝恩資本公司呢？至少有套標準可以衡量，從衡量的結果來看，羅姆尼經營貝恩資本公司的期間員工特別不好過。經財產評估，價值最高的十家併購目標公司裡，有四家最後以破產作收，儘管貝恩資本公司還是在其中三家的交易案賺了一筆。這樣的失敗率比一般從事融資併購的公司還高，而且當公司關門大吉，眾多員工不是沒了工作，就是沒了退休金，甚至兩頭都落空。

 

 

我們從中學到了什麼教訓？倒不是說商人羅姆尼是大壞蛋，而是自由派並沒有像保守派聲稱的要妖魔化或懲罰富人。自由派只是反對右派對富人造神，反對富人能免除人人都該做出的犧牲，只因為他們好像有為大家做出非常美好的貢獻。

 

 

真相就是就算對百分之一的人，甚至對百分之0.1的人有利，也不盡然表示這對全體美國都有益，羅姆尼的過往經歷已經充分說明了這道理。沒有理由也沒有必要去恨羅姆尼一類的人，該做的就是要求他們多繳點稅，別受創造就業這類謬論影響。

[克魯曼專欄] Killing the Euro 摧毀歐元 原文載於(2011/12/02)

原文出於NY Times

Can the euro be saved? Not long ago we were told that the worst possible outcome was a Greek default. Now a much wider disaster seems all too likely.

歐元還有救嗎？不久前大家還在說最糟的結果就是希臘違約，如今看來可能有更大的災難即將來臨。

True, market pressure lifted a bit on Wednesday after central banks made a splashy announcement about expanded credit lines (which will, in fact, make hardly any real difference). But even optimists now see Europe as headed for recession, while pessimists warn that the euro may become the epicenter of another global financial crisis.

沒錯，多家重要銀行在星期三發表了備受好評的聲明，宣布擴大信用額度。雖說此舉其實幾乎沒有實質意義，但市場壓力因此還是稍有疏緩。然而就算是樂天派如今也會認為歐洲正步入衰退，而悲觀者則發出警告，歐元會成為另一場全球金融危機的震央。

How did things go so wrong? The answer you hear all the time is that the euro crisis was caused by fiscal irresponsibility. Turn on your TV and you’re very likely to find some pundit declaring that if America doesn’t slash spending we’ll end up like Greece. Greeeeeece!

事情怎麼會走到這地步？每每得到的答案都是財政上的不負責任導致歐元危機。打開電視，大概一定會看到有專家稱美國若不削減支出，最後的下場會和希臘一樣。天啊，希臘耶！

But the truth is nearly the opposite. Although Europe’s leaders continue to insist that the problem is too much spending in debtor nations, the real problem is too little spending in Europe as a whole. And their efforts to fix matters by demanding ever harsher austerity have played a major role in making the situation worse.

可是真相幾乎正好相反。儘管歐洲領導人依舊堅持問題出在債務國家支出過多，但真正的問題是整個歐洲的支出實在太少，而各國的解決方案是要求更嚴苛的財政緊縮，反而成為市場惡化的主要原因。

The story so far: In the years leading up to the 2008 crisis, Europe, like America, had a runaway banking system and a rapid buildup of debt. In Europe’s case, however, much of the lending was across borders, as funds from Germany flowed into southern Europe. This lending was perceived as low risk. Hey, the recipients were all on the euro, so what could go wrong?

目前的情況如下，在邁向2008年金融危機的前幾年，歐洲一如美國，金融體系發展有如脫韁野馬，債務也迅速累積。不過歐洲有點不同，就是大多借貸跨越國界，資金由德國流入南歐。大家認為這種借貸風險不高，畢竟借錢的國家也都是使用歐元，怎麼會有問題呢？

For the most part, by the way, this lending went to the private sector, not to governments. Only Greece ran large budget deficits during the good years; Spain actually had a surplus on the eve of the crisis.

順帶一提，大多這類借貸都是流入民營部門而非政府機關。只有希臘在繁榮的那幾年預算赤字大幅增加，西班牙甚至在危機前夕都還擁有盈餘。

Then the bubble burst. Private spending in the debtor nations fell sharply. And the question European leaders should have been asking was how to keep those spending cuts from causing a Europe-wide downturn.

接著泡沫破滅了，債務國家的民間支出巨幅滑落，歐洲領導人應該尋求如何避免支出減少成為蔓延全歐的衰退。

Instead, however, they responded to the inevitable, recession-driven rise in deficits by demanding that all governments — not just those of the debtor nations — slash spending and raise taxes. Warnings that this would deepen the slump were waved away. “The idea that austerity measures could trigger stagnation is incorrect,” declared Jean-Claude Trichet, then the president of the European Central Bank. Why? Because “confidence-inspiring policies will foster and not hamper economic recovery.”

然而歐洲領導人卻反其道而行，面對因為衰退而必然引起的赤字增加，反應卻是不單要求債務國家，而是要求所有政府嚴格削減支出以及增稅，對所有認為此舉會加深衰退的警告充耳不聞。歐洲央行總裁特里謝聲稱「財政緊縮會導致經濟停滯的看法是錯的。」為什麼呢？「這種增加市場信心的政策，會促進而非阻礙經濟復甦。」

But the confidence fairy was a no-show.

不過信心傳說從未成真。

Wait, there’s more. During the years of easy money, wages and prices in southern Europe rose substantially faster than in northern Europe. This divergence now needs to be reversed, either through falling prices in the south or through rising prices in the north. And it matters which: If southern Europe is forced to deflate its way to competitiveness, it will both pay a heavy price in employment and worsen its debt problems. The chances of success would be much greater if the gap were closed via rising prices in the north.

事情還沒完呢，在資金充分流動的那些年頭，南歐的薪資與物價成長幅度大多高於北部歐洲。如今這差異要顛倒過來，不是南部的物價下跌，就是北部的物價上揚。兩種選擇會有所差異，若強迫南歐透過通貨緊縮恢復競爭力，就業市場就要付出極大代價，而債務問題也會更加惡化。若藉由提升北部的物價來縮小差距，成功的機會要大的多。

But to close the gap through rising prices in the north, policy makers would have to accept temporarily higher inflation for the euro area as a whole. And they’ve made it clear that they won’t. Last April, in fact, the European Central Bank began raising interest rates, even though it was obvious to most observers that underlying inflation was, if anything, too low.

不過想透過提升北部物價縮小差距，制定政策的人必須接受整體歐元區暫時的高通貨膨脹，不過他們已經挑明絕不會這麼做。事實上去年四月，儘管大多觀察都顯示基礎通膨明顯過低，歐洲央行還是選擇升息。

And it’s probably no coincidence that April was also when the euro crisis entered its new, dire phase. Never mind Greece, whose economy is to Europe roughly as greater Miami is to the United States. At this point, markets have lost faith in the euro as a whole, driving up interest rates even for countries like Austria and Finland, hardly known for profligacy. And it’s not hard to see why. The combination of austerity-for-all and a central bank morbidly obsessed with inflation makes it essentially impossible for indebted countries to escape from their debt trap and is, therefore, a recipe for widespread debt defaults, bank runs and general financial collapse.

而也就是在去年四月，歐元危機進入了全新的可怕階段，這恐怕不是巧合。別管希臘了，希臘的經濟之於整個歐洲，也只大略等於稍大的邁阿密之於美國。目前市場已經對歐元喪失信心，連帶導致從未聽說浪費的國家如奧地利與芬蘭也利率上揚。理由很容易理解，就是全面要求歐元區財政緊縮，還有歐洲央行偏執的否定通貨膨脹其實可以幫助負債國家脫離債務困境。結果就是廣泛的債務違約，銀行擠兌和金融崩潰。

I hope, for our sake as well as theirs, that the Europeans will change course before it’s too late. But, to be honest, I don’t believe they will. In fact, what’s much more likely is that we will follow them down the path to ruin.

為了我們自己也為了歐洲，我希望歐洲人能在為時已晚之前改弦易轍。但老實說，我不相信他們會這麼做。更有可能的，是我們跟隨歐洲一起踏上通往殘破廢墟的道路。

For in America, as in Europe, the economy is being dragged down by troubled debtors — in our case, mainly homeowners. And here, too, we desperately need expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to support the economy as these debtors struggle back to financial health. Yet, as in Europe, public discourse is dominated by deficit scolds and inflation obsessives.

而美國就如歐洲，經濟受到深陷困境的債務人所拖累，我們主要的債務人是屋主。此外，在債務人掙扎著重回財務正常的同時，我們也需要擴大財政與貨幣政策來幫助經濟。但也像歐洲，我們公眾論述的聲音，都為嘮叨赤字與通膨妄想的聲音所壟斷。

So the next time you hear someone claiming that if we don’t slash spending we’ll turn into Greece, your answer should be that if we do slash spending while the economy is still in a depression, we’ll turn into Europe. In fact, we’re well on our way.

所以下次有人聲稱我們若不削減支出就會變成下一個希臘時，回答他若在經濟蕭條時削減支出，我們就會變成下一個歐洲。事實上，我們的確正在走這條路。

[克魯曼專欄] Things to Tax 來課稅吧 原文載於(2011/11/28)

原文出於NY Times



The supercommittee was a superdud — and we should be glad. Nonetheless, at some point we’ll have to rein in budget deficits. And when we do, here’s a thought: How about making increased revenue an important part of the deal?


超級委員會超沒用─而且我們都該為此感到高興。話雖如此，某方面來說我們還是要控制預算赤字。所以我有個想法，把增加稅收列為減赤方案的重要一部份如何？


And I don’t just mean a return to Clinton-era tax rates. Why should 1990s taxes be considered the outer limit of revenue collection? Think about it: The long-run budget outlook has darkened, which means that some hard choices must be made. Why should those choices only involve spending cuts? Why not also push some taxes above their levels in the 1990s?


我是說稅率不只調回柯林頓時代的水準，為什麼要把1990年代的稅率水準當成極限呢？想想看，長期預算前景看來黯淡無光，這表示一定要做出困難的抉擇。為何選項只包括刪減支出，不調升某些稅率到超過1990年代的水準呢？


Let me suggest two areas in which it would make a lot of sense to raise taxes in earnest, not just return them to pre-Bush levels: taxes on very high incomes and taxes on financial transactions.


調高稅收非常合理，而不是單純回到布希時代前的水準。讓我真心建議兩條路，就是對超高所得者還有金融交易收稅。


About those high incomes: In my last column I suggested that the very rich, who have had huge income gains over the last 30 years, should pay more in taxes. I got many responses from readers, with a common theme being that this was silly, that even confiscatory taxes on the wealthy couldn’t possibly raise enough money to matter.


首先是關於高收入戶。在上一篇專欄我有提議，過去三十年來收入遽增的巨富應該多繳點稅。對此我收到了很多讀者回應，大半的意見都是說加稅太瘋狂了，就算對富人徵收懲罰性的沒收稅也徵不到多少錢。


Folks, you’re living in the past. Once upon a time America was a middle-class nation, in which the super-elite’s income was no big deal. But that was another country.


大夥兒，你們還活在過去。美國曾經是個中產階級國家，超級精英的收入也沒什麼了不起，但那已經是另一個國家了。


The I.R.S. reports that in 2007, that is, before the economic crisis, the top 0.1 percent of taxpayers — roughly speaking, people with annual incomes over $2 million — had a combined income of more than a trillion dollars. That’s a lot of money, and it wouldn’t be hard to devise taxes that would raise a significant amount of revenue from those super-high-income individuals.


美國國稅局在2007年，也就是經濟危機前有份報告，最高百分之0.1的納稅人─大略來說就是年收入超過兩百萬元的人，所繳的稅综合起來超過一兆美元。這可是一大筆錢，我們可以針對收入超高的人設計一種稅，如此國庫收益肯定有顯著增長，而且一點也不難。


For example, a recent report by the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center points out that before 1980 very-high-income individuals fell into tax brackets well above the 35 percent top rate that applies today. According to the center’s analysis, restoring those high-income brackets would have raised $78 billion in 2007, or more than half a percent of G.D.P. I’ve extrapolated that number using Congressional Budget Office projections, and what I get for the next decade is that high-income taxation could shave more than $1 trillion off the deficit.


例如跨黨派組織稅務政策中心前陣子出版的報告，報告指出超高收入者的稅率級次要比1980年還要低百分之35。根據稅務政策中心的分析，如果把稅率級次調回1980年的水準，那麼2007年稅收可以多780億美元，超過國內生產毛額(G.D.P.)的百分之0.5。我用國會預算處的預測來推算，該稅率可以在未來十年削減超過一兆美元的赤字。


It’s instructive to compare that estimate with the savings from the kinds of proposals that are actually circulating in Washington these days. Consider, for example, proposals to raise the age of Medicare eligibility to 67, dealing a major blow to millions of Americans. How much money would that save?


比起這幾天在華盛頓四處流傳的提案，前項稅率的建議不僅預估可以節省較多預算，也更具有意義。打個比方，有提案打算把聯邦醫療保險的資格提高到67歲，影響數以百萬的美國人。想想看，這可以省下多少錢呢？


Well, none from the point of view of the nation as a whole, since we would be pushing seniors out of Medicare and into private insurance, which has substantially higher costs. True, it would reduce federal spending — but not by much. The budget office estimates that outlays would fall by only $125 billion over the next decade, as the age increase phased in. And even when fully phased in, this partial dismantling of Medicare would reduce the deficit only about a third as much as could be achieved with higher taxes on the very rich.


嗯...以國家整體的角度來看，一毛也沒省。因為這樣做只會讓其他年紀較長的人離開聯邦醫療保險體系，轉而投向民營保險，實際上支出反而更多。沒錯，此舉會降低聯邦支出，但也沒降低多少。國會預算處估計，隨著階段性的提升限制年齡，在未來三十年可以省下1250億美元。就算最終達到目標的年齡限制，廢除部分的聯邦醫療保險，降低的赤字也只有先前所提，對富人增稅的三分之一而已。


So raising taxes on the very rich could make a serious contribution to deficit reduction. Don’t believe anyone who claims otherwise.


因此對非常富有的人增稅，可以為降低赤字做出巨大貢獻。如果有任何人聲稱不同的結果，千萬別相信。


And then there’s the idea of taxing financial transactions, which have exploded in recent decades. The economic value of all this trading is dubious at best. In fact, there’s considerable evidence suggesting that too much trading is going on. Still, nobody is proposing a punitive tax. On the table, instead, are proposals like the one recently made by Senator Tom Harkin and Representative Peter DeFazio for a tiny fee on financial transactions.


另外，還可以對這幾十年來爆增的金融交易課稅。就算往最好的方面想，此類金融交易的經濟價值還是頗令人懷疑，事實上相當多的證據都暗示這類交易已經過多了。儘管如此，依然沒有人針對金融交易提出嚴苛的稅金。近來真正有在檯面上討論的，只有如哈金參議員和德法西歐眾議員的提案，對金融交易收取小額費用。


And here’s the thing: Because there are so many transactions, such a fee could yield several hundred billion dollars in revenue over the next decade. Again, this compares favorably with the savings from many of the harsh spending cuts being proposed in the name of fiscal responsibility.


然而事實上由於金融交易眾多，對金融交易課稅在未來十年可以產生數千億美元的收益。比起目前許多以財政紀律為名，大砍支出的提案，課稅再次證明更為適當。


But wouldn’t such a tax hurt economic growth? As I said, the evidence suggests not — if anything, it suggests that to the extent that taxing financial transactions reduces the volume of wheeling and dealing, that would be a good thing.


可是這類稅金會傷害經濟成長嗎？如我先前所說，證據顯示並非如此，甚至對金融交易課稅反而還會減少投機炒作的交易，可說是好事一樁。


And it’s instructive, too, to note that some economies already have financial transactions taxes — and that among those who do are Hong Kong and Singapore. If some conservative starts claiming that such taxes are an unwarranted government intrusion, you might want to ask him why such taxes are imposed by the two countries that score highest on the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.


更有啟發性的是，已經有其他經濟體對金融交易課稅，包含香港及新加坡。如果有保守派的人開始嚷嚷這類課稅是政府未經授權的侵權行為，可以反問他那為什麼有課相同稅金的兩個國家，反而在美國傳統基金會(譯註：保守派組織)公佈的經濟自由度指數得到最高分呢？


Now, the tax ideas I’ve just mentioned wouldn’t be enough, by themselves, to fix our deficit. But the same is true of proposals for spending cuts. The point I’m making here isn’t that taxes are all we need; it is that they could and should be a significant part of the solution.


要解決赤字問題，我所提的課稅方案還是不夠，可是削減支出的提案也是如此。我的用意不是說多課稅就可以完全解決赤字問題，但這可以，也的確是十分明顯的解決方案。

[克魯曼專欄] We Are the 99.9% 我們代表99.9% 原文載於(2011/11/25)

原文出於NY Times



“We are the 99 percent” is a great slogan. It correctly defines the issue as being the middle class versus the elite (as opposed to the middle class versus the poor). And it also gets past the common but wrong establishment notion that rising inequality is mainly about the well educated doing better than the less educated; the big winners in this new Gilded Age have been a handful of very wealthy people, not college graduates in general.


「我們代表99%」是句超棒的口號，明白定義出這是中產階級對菁英階級(相反就是中產階級對貧窮階級)的議題，同時也化解了長久以來的錯誤觀念，以為攀升的不平等主要是有無接受良好教育的分別。大致上新鍍金世代的大贏家是一小群大富大貴的人，而不是大學畢業生。


If anything, however, the 99 percent slogan aims too low. A large fraction of the top 1 percent’s gains have actually gone to an even smaller group, the top 0.1 percent — the richest one-thousandth of the population.


不過嚴格來說，口號的99%設的有點低，大部分的利益成長是流向1%中更小一群人，就是0.1%─最富有的千分之一。


And while Democrats, by and large, want that super-elite to make at least some contribution to long-term deficit reduction, Republicans want to cut the super-elite’s taxes even as they slash Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid in the name of fiscal discipline.


大致看來，目前民主黨要求這些超級菁英能為降低長期赤字多少盡點心力，而共和黨卻打算減免超級精英的稅，同時打著財政紀律的口號大砍社福預算、聯邦醫療保險以及醫療補助。


Before I get to those policy disputes, here are a few numbers.


在我爭論這些政策之前，我們先來看些數字。


The recent Congressional Budget Office report on inequality didn’t look inside the top 1 percent, but an earlier report, which only went up to 2005, did. According to that report, between 1979 and 2005 the inflation-adjusted, after-tax income of Americans in the middle of the income distribution rose 21 percent. The equivalent number for the richest 0.1 percent rose 400 percent.


最近國會預算辦公室針對不平等發表的報告，並沒有仔細檢視最高的1%，不過根據稍早2005年的報告，從1979到2005年，美國中產階級的稅後所得分配經過通膨調整後成長了21%，而那最富有0.1%階層收入分配則成長了400%。


For the most part, these huge gains reflected a dramatic rise in the super-elite’s share of pretax income. But there were also large tax cuts favoring the wealthy. In particular, taxes on capital gains are much lower than they were in 1979 — and the richest one-thousandth of Americans account for half of all income from capital gains.


巨額所得增長代表超級菁英的稅前所得劇增，而且還有偏袒富人的減稅，另外現今資本利得稅也比1979年時來的低，而那千分之一美國人的資產有超過一半是來自資本利得。


Given this history, why do Republicans advocate further tax cuts for the very rich even as they warn about deficits and demand drastic cuts in social insurance programs?


既然如此，為何共和黨還邊鼓吹要替巨富減稅，又大聲警告赤字，劇幅縮減社會保險制度的預算呢？


Well, aside from shouts of “class warfare!” whenever such questions are raised, the usual answer is that the super-elite are “job creators” — that is, that they make a special contribution to the economy. So what you need to know is that this is bad economics. In fact, it would be bad economics even if America had the idealized, perfect market economy of conservative fantasies.


先撇開「這是階級戰爭！」這類每次提起這問題都會冒出的吶喊，通常得到的回應超級精英創造就業機會，也就是說對經濟具有特殊貢獻。要知道這不是好的理由，就算美國擁有保守派夢想中的完美市場，也依然不是好理由。


After all, in an idealized market economy each worker would be paid exactly what he or she contributes to the economy by choosing to work, no more and no less. And this would be equally true for workers making $30,000 a year and executives making $30 million a year. There would be no reason to consider the contributions of the $30 million folks as deserving of special treatment.


在完美市場狀態內工作的員工，所得的薪資正好等於他透過工作對經濟所做出的貢獻度，不會多也不會少。基於同樣的道理，工人年收入是三萬美元，執行長年收入是三千萬美元。沒理由認為年收入三千萬美元的人比較有貢獻，值得擁有特殊待遇。


But, you say, the rich pay taxes! Indeed, they do. And they could — and should, from the point of view of the 99.9 percent — be paying substantially more in taxes, not offered even more tax breaks, despite the alleged budget crisis, because of the wonderful things they supposedly do.


可能有人會說「但是富人要繳稅！」沒錯，確實如此。不過富人可以，也應該(從99.9%的人的角度來看)繳交更多的稅，而不是在聲稱有預算危機的情形下還幫富人減稅，只因為他們似乎有做一些很美好的事情。


Still, don’t some of the very rich get that way by producing innovations that are worth far more to the world than the income they receive? Sure, but if you look at who really makes up the 0.1 percent, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that, by and large, the members of the super-elite are overpaid, not underpaid, for what they do.


僅管如此，有些巨富替世界帶來重大革新，難道他們不該得到除了收入以外更多的東西嗎？當然可以，不過若仔細檢視這0.1%的成員，一般來說很難不得到一個結論，就是根據這群超級精英的所作所為，他們的薪水不僅沒有受到虧待，反而還過分高估了。


For who are the 0.1 percent? Very few of them are Steve Jobs-type innovators; most of them are corporate bigwigs and financial wheeler-dealers. One recent analysis found that 43 percent of the super-elite are executives at nonfinancial companies, 18 percent are in finance and another 12 percent are lawyers or in real estate. And these are not, to put it mildly, professions in which there is a clear relationship between someone’s income and his economic contribution.


究竟誰是這0.1%？只有一小部分的人是像賈伯斯那樣的革新家，大部分的人是企業大亨和金融炒手。一份最近的分析指出超級精英中43%是非金融公司的主管，18%是金融公司主管，還有12%得人是律師或是房地產業。委婉來說這群人的職業裡，所得和經濟貢獻度的關聯似乎沒有那麼分明。


Executive pay, which has skyrocketed over the past generation, is famously set by boards of directors appointed by the very people whose pay they determine; poorly performing C.E.O.’s still get lavish paychecks, and even failed and fired executives often receive millions as they go out the door.


主管薪資在上個世代一飛沖天。主管薪資高低是由董事會所決定，可是董事會的成員卻正好又是這些主管所指派的。因此表現差勁的執行長還是得到豐厚的薪資，甚至徹底失敗以及被開除的主管常常都可以在離開前先領走數百萬美元。


Meanwhile, the economic crisis showed that much of the apparent value created by modern finance was a mirage. As the Bank of England’s director for financial stability recently put it, seemingly high returns before the crisis simply reflected increased risk-taking — risk that was mostly borne not by the wheeler-dealers themselves but either by naïve investors or by taxpayers, who ended up holding the bag when it all went wrong. And as he waspishly noted, “If risk-making were a value-adding activity, Russian roulette players would contribute disproportionately to global welfare.”


還有這次的金融危機顯示，很多現代金融創造出來，看起來很有價值的資產不過是海市蜃樓。一如英格蘭銀行總裁為了穩定金融所說的，危機前的高收益只是反應出了不斷增加的高投機風險，而且出差錯的代價幾乎不是由金融炒手所承擔，而是由天真的投資者與納稅人全數負責。另外總裁又很刻薄的註明了「如果投機行為真的具有附加價值，那俄羅斯羅盤的玩家一定給全球貢獻超大的福利了。」


So should the 99.9 percent hate the 0.1 percent? No, not at all. But they should ignore all the propaganda about “job creators” and demand that the super-elite pay substantially more in taxes.


所以99.9%的人該痛恨0.1%的人囉？當然不是，不過前者應該要無視什麼「創造就業」之類的宣傳，並要求這些超級精英繳交更多的稅金。

[克魯曼專欄] Boring, Cruel Euro Romantics 無趣又殘酷的歐洲夢想家 原文載於(2011/11/21)

原文出於NY Times



There’s a word I keep hearing lately: “technocrat.” Sometimes it’s used as a term of scorn — the creators of the euro, we’re told, were technocrats who failed to take human and cultural factors into account. Sometimes it’s a term of praise: the newly installed prime ministers of Greece and Italy are described as technocrats who will rise above politics and do what needs to be done.


近來我常聽到一個單字「技術官僚」。有時候這單字會拿來嘲笑某人，像稱呼創造歐元的人都是技術官僚，說他們當初沒有把人為因素和文化因素列入考量。而有時候這單字則是拿來讚美某人，如稱呼希臘和義大利新上任的總理都是技術官僚，可以超越政治角度，確實完成該做的事。


I call foul. I know from technocrats; sometimes I even play one myself. And these people — the people who bullied Europe into adopting a common currency, the people who are bullying both Europe and the United States into austerity — aren’t technocrats. They are, instead, deeply impractical romantics.


不過我得說沒這回事，因為我認識這群技術官僚，甚至我自己有時候也扮演這角色。可是這群人─包含要建立歐洲統一貨幣的人、強迫歐洲和美國都要實施財政緊縮的人都不算什麼技術官僚，他們只不過是完全不切實際的夢想家罷了。


They are, to be sure, a peculiarly boring breed of romantic, speaking in turgid prose rather than poetry. And the things they demand on behalf of their romantic visions are often cruel, involving huge sacrifices from ordinary workers and families. But the fact remains that those visions are driven by dreams about the way things should be rather than by a cool assessment of the way things really are.


更精確的說，這群人是一派又無聊又古怪的夢想家。比起吟詩，他們更常發表誇大且乏味的散文，而且浪漫的腦袋總是提出十分殘酷的要求，要求普通勞工及家庭做出重大犧牲。但這些要求都是依照他們腦袋裡的妄想提出的，而非來自於對實際情形的精確評估。


And to save the world economy we must topple these dangerous romantics from their pedestals.


想要拯救世界經濟，就必須先把這些危險的夢想家趕下臺。

Let’s start with the creation of the euro. If you think that this was a project driven by careful calculation of costs and benefits, you have been misinformed.


先從歐元的誕生談起。若認為在歐元成立前有經過非常精準的支出與收益評估，那你肯定是受人誤導。


The truth is that Europe’s march toward a common currency was, from the beginning, a dubious project on any objective economic analysis. The continent’s economies were too disparate to function smoothly with one-size-fits-all monetary policy, too likely to experience “asymmetric shocks” in which some countries slumped while others boomed. And unlike U.S. states, European countries weren’t part of a single nation with a unified budget and a labor market tied together by a common language.


打從一開始，任何客觀的經濟分析都對歐洲能否邁向統一貨幣半信半疑。全歐洲各經濟體差異極大，很難有一體適用的財政政策，因此相當容易受到「不對稱衝擊」的影響，也就是指有些國家深陷不景氣，同時有些國家卻景氣過熱。此外與美國的各州不同，歐洲各國不屬於同一個國家，沒有統一的預算，也沒有共通語言的勞動市場。


So why did those “technocrats” push so hard for the euro, disregarding many warnings from economists? Partly it was the dream of European unification, which the Continent’s elite found so alluring that its members waved away practical objections. And partly it was a leap of economic faith, the hope — driven by the will to believe, despite vast evidence to the contrary — that everything would work out as long as nations practiced the Victorian virtues of price stability and fiscal prudence.


那為什麼這群「技術官僚」如此賣力推動歐元，完全無視眾多經濟學家提出的警告呢？部分是因為想完成統一歐洲的春秋大夢，這夢對歐洲菁英來說是如此誘人，所以很多人都未提出實質反對。另一部份是對經濟遽增的信心，儘管有大量證據反對，但還是盲目希望只要能維持維多利亞時代的物價穩定以及謹慎財政，一切都會完美運作。


Sad to say, things did not work out as promised. But rather than adjusting to reality, those supposed technocrats just doubled down — insisting, for example, that Greece could avoid default through savage austerity, when anyone who actually did the math knew better.


難過的是，事情終究沒有像先前保證的那般完美。然而這群所謂技術官僚不僅沒有配合現實調整制度，反而還加倍下注，例如堅持只要希臘遵守極嚴格的財政緊縮就一定不會違約，可是任何一個會算數的人都知道答案不是如此。


Let me single out in particular the European Central Bank (E.C.B.), which is supposed to be the ultimate technocratic institution, and which has been especially notable for taking refuge in fantasy as things go wrong. Last year, for example, the bank affirmed its belief in the confidence fairy — that is, the claim that budget cuts in a depressed economy will actually promote expansion, by raising business and consumer confidence. Strange to say, that hasn’t happened anywhere.


我特別要指名歐洲央行(E.C.B.)，本來該是最終的技術官僚機構，然而在情況出錯時卻反而躲進幻想世界裡。如去年就證實了歐洲央行深信信心神話，聲稱在經濟不景氣時縮減預算反而會促進經濟成長，因為如此一來會提升商業與消費者信心。不過很奇怪，這預測從來就沒有發生。


And now, with Europe in crisis — a crisis that can’t be contained unless the E.C.B. steps in to stop the vicious circle of financial collapse — its leaders still cling to the notion that price stability cures all ills. Last week Mario Draghi, the E.C.B.’s new president, declared that “anchoring inflation expectations” is “the major contribution we can make in support of sustainable growth, employment creation and financial stability.”


如今歐洲面臨危機，除非歐洲央行介入，阻止財政崩壞的惡性循環才能控制這場危機，可是歐洲領導人還是堅信物價穩定是所有問題的解答。上個星期歐洲央行的新總裁德拉吉宣稱「固定通貨膨脹預期是我們幫助經濟持續成長，創造就業，穩定經濟所能做的主要貢獻。」


This is an utterly fantastic claim to make at a time when expected European inflation is, if anything, too low, and what’s roiling the markets is fear of more or less immediate financial collapse. And it’s more like a religious proclamation than a technocratic assessment.


這聲明徹頭徹尾就是胡言亂語，比較像是宗教宣言而不是技術評估。真要說起來歐洲的通膨預期反而還太低，而且市場上瀰漫的恐懼是擔心財政的立即崩潰。


Just to be clear, this is not an anti-European rant, since we have our own pseudo-technocrats warping the policy debate. In particular, allegedly nonpartisan groups of “experts” — the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, the Concord Coalition, and so on — have been all too successful at hijacking the economic policy debate, shifting its focus from jobs to deficits.


不過要聲明，這篇文章不是拿來謾罵歐洲，因為我們也有群假扮成技術官僚的人在扭曲政策。此外還有其他據說是秉持中立的「專家」組成的團體如盡責聯邦預算委員會、反赤字協和聯盟等，成功挾持經濟政策的辯論焦點，把目光從就業轉移到赤字上。


Real technocrats would have asked why this makes sense at a time when the unemployment rate is 9 percent and the interest rate on U.S. debt is only 2 percent. But like the E.C.B., our fiscal scolds have their story about what’s important, and they’re sticking to it no matter what the data say.


真正的技術官僚會想尋求解答，想了解為什麼失業率高達9%而美國國債利率只有2%。然而我們的財政嘮叨大嬸，如歐洲央行對事情的輕重緩急卻有自己的看法，而且不管數據如何解釋都無法改變意見。


So am I against technocrats? Not at all. I like technocrats — technocrats are friends of mine. And we need technical expertise to deal with our economic woes.


那麼我是反對技術官僚囉？也不盡然。我喜歡技術官僚，其中有些人還是我的朋友，而且我們還需要專業的意見來處理目前經濟困境。


But our discourse is being badly distorted by ideologues and wishful thinkers — boring, cruel romantics — pretending to be technocrats. And it’s time to puncture their pretensions.


但我們的討論已經被意識形態和癡心妄想嚴重扭曲，這群無聊又殘忍的夢想家假裝自己是技術官僚，是時候戳破他們吹的牛皮了。

[克魯曼專欄] Vouchers for Veterans 老兵的憑證 原文載於(2011/11/14)

原文出於NY Times

American health care is remarkably diverse. In terms of how care is paid for and delivered, many of us effectively live in Canada, some live in Switzerland, some live in Britain, and some live in the unregulated market of conservative dreams. One result of this diversity is that we have plenty of home-grown evidence about what works and what doesn’t.

美國的健保系統最引人注目的地方莫過於其多樣性，以繳費及提供的服務來看，很多人其實是住在加拿大，有些是在瑞士，有的則是在英國，還有些人則是住在保守派夢想中沒有任何管制的市場。這些各式各樣的種類產生的成果，就是有了大量自家證據證明哪些管用，哪些沒用。

Naturally, then, politicians — Republicans in particular — are determined to scrap what works and promote what doesn’t. And that brings me to Mitt Romney’s latest really bad idea, unveiled on Veterans Day: to partially privatize the Veterans Health Administration (V.H.A.).

於是很自然的，有政客──尤其是共和黨人毅然而然的要把可行的健保服務作廢，同時大聲宣揚行不通的健保服務。這讓我想到羅尼最近在退伍軍人節披露的壞主意，說要把部分退伍軍人健康管理局(V.H.A.)民營化。

What Mr. Romney and everyone else should know is that the V.H.A. is a huge policy success story, which offers important lessons for future health reform.

羅尼先生和所有人都該了解，退伍軍人健康管理局是空前成功的政策，也給未來健保改革帶來貴重的啟示。

Many people still have an image of veterans’ health care based on the terrible state of the system two decades ago. Under the Clinton administration, however, the V.H.A. was overhauled, and achieved a remarkable combination of rising quality and successful cost control. Multiple surveys have found the V.H.A. providing better care than most Americans receive, even as the agency has held cost increases well below those facing Medicare and private insurers. Furthermore, the V.H.A. has led the way in cost-saving innovation, especially the use of electronic medical records.

很多人對退伍軍人健康管理局的印象還停在二十年前糟糕透頂的情況，然而在柯林頓主政時期，整個退伍軍人健康管理局已經大幅改造，成了提高品質與費用控制的耀眼組合。許多調查表明退伍軍人健康管理局提供的健保服務，比大多數美國人所擁有的還好，而且支出控制得宜，費用低於聯邦醫療保險(Medicare)以及民營保險。此外退伍軍人健康管理局在節省支出的創舉上算是領頭羊，特別像是使用電子醫療紀錄。

What’s behind this success? Crucially, the V.H.A. is an integrated system, which provides health care as well as paying for it. So it’s free from the perverse incentives created when doctors and hospitals profit from expensive tests and procedures, whether or not those procedures actually make medical sense. And because V.H.A. patients are in it for the long term, the agency has a stronger incentive to invest in prevention than private insurers, many of whose customers move on after a few years.

成功背後的原因是什麼？關鍵在於退伍軍人健康管理局是個綜合系統，同時提供健保及給付健保費，因此可以免除一些不良誘因，如醫生和醫院可以從昂貴的實驗與療程來獲利，不管這些療程是不是真的有醫學意義。而且相較於民營保險的顧客沒幾年就不續保了，退伍軍人健康管理局的病人都是長期保險，所以有更強的誘因去注重疾病預防。

And yes, this is “socialized medicine” — although some private systems, like Kaiser Permanente, share many of the V.H.A.’s virtues. But it works — and suggests what it will take to solve the troubles of U.S. health care more broadly.

沒錯，這是公費醫療系統，雖說有些民營系統如Kaiser Permanente也有許多退伍軍人健康管理局的優點，但這系統真的管用，同時在解決美國健保的問題上給了更廣泛的解答。

Yet Mr. Romney believes that giving veterans vouchers to spend on private insurance would somehow yield better results. Why?

不過羅尼先生深信，給退伍軍人可以用在民營保險的憑單會更好。為什麼呢？

Well, Republicans have a thing about vouchers. Earlier this year Representative Paul Ryan famously introduced a plan to convert Medicare into a voucher system; Mr. Romney’s Medicare proposal follows similar lines. The claim, always, is the one Mr. Romney made last week, that “private sector competition” would lower costs.

這個嘛，共和黨人對憑單特別感興趣。今年稍早眾議員萊恩引人注目的引進一套把聯邦醫療保險轉換為憑單制度的方案，而現在羅尼的聯邦醫療保險提案內容也是老生常談。羅尼先生上個星期發布聲明，又是千篇一律的說「民營企業競爭」會降低成本。

But we have a lot of evidence about how private-sector competition in health insurance works, and it’s not favorable. The individual insurance market, which comes closest to the conservative ideal of free competition, has huge administrative costs and has no demonstrated ability to reduce other costs. Medicare Advantage, which allows Medicare beneficiaries to buy private insurance instead of having Medicare pay bills directly, has consistently had higher costs than the traditional program.

可是我們已經有很多證據說明健保讓民營企業競爭的結果，而且這結果不太好看。如最接近保守派自由競爭理念的個人健康保險市場，不僅付出了龐大的行政成本，也沒顯示出其他降低成本的能力。像聯邦醫療保險優惠計畫(Medicare Advantage)允許聯邦醫療保險的受益人可以購買民營保險，代替直接付費給聯邦醫療保險，可是這項方案的成本持續攀高，還超過原本方案。

And the international evidence accords with U.S. experience. The most efficient health care systems are integrated systems like the V.H.A.; next best are single-payer systems like Medicare; the more privatized the system, the worse it performs.

國際上的證據也與美國經驗一致。最有效率的健保系統是綜合式系統如退伍軍人健康管理局，次佳的是單一付費者系統如聯邦醫療保險。系統越民營化，表現得越差。

To be fair to Mr. Romney, he takes a somewhat softer line than others in his party, suggesting that the existing V.H.A. system would remain available and that traditional Medicare would remain an option. In practice, however, partial privatization would almost surely undermine the public side of these programs. For example, one problem with the V.H.A. is that its hospitals are spread too thinly across the nation; this problem would become worse if a substantial number of veterans were encouraged to opt out of the system.

不過要幫羅尼先生說句公道話，他比起其他同黨人士說詞較為溫和，建議現存的退伍軍人健康管理局系統可以持續，傳統的聯邦醫療保險也可以列為選項。然而實際上，部分民營化最終一定會侵蝕公營部分的基礎。舉例來說，退伍軍人健康管理局的其中一個問題是全國有支援的醫院太少，如果鼓勵許多退伍軍人離開這體系，問題會很快惡化。

So what lies behind the Republican obsession with privatization and voucherization? Ideology, of course. It’s literally a fundamental article of faith in the G.O.P. that the private sector is always better than the government, and no amount of evidence can shake that credo.

所以共和黨熱情追求民營化與證券化的原因為何呢？當然是意識形態作祟。共和黨的基本信念就是民間企業一定好過政府，無論多少證據都不能撼動其信條。

In fact, it’s hard to avoid the sense that Republicans are especially eager to dismantle government programs that act as living demonstrations that their ideology is wrong. Bloated military budgets don’t bother them much — Mr. Romney has pledged to reverse President Obama’s defense cuts, despite the fact that no such cuts have actually taken place. But successful programs like veterans’ health, Social Security and Medicare are in the crosshairs.

事實上很難避免共和黨去廢除這些政府方案，因為這些方案就像是他們信念錯誤的活證明。對他們來說膨大的軍事預算無所謂，羅尼先生還誓言要推翻歐巴馬總統的國防預算縮編案，儘管根本就沒有要刪減，然而卻把準心瞄準成功的方案如退伍軍人健保、社福制度、聯邦醫療保險。

Which brings me to a final thought: maybe all this amounts to a case for Rick Perry. Any Republican would, if elected president, set out to undermine precisely those government programs that work best. But Mr. Perry might not remember which programs he was supposed to destroy.

我最後的想法如下，也許這一切只是為了要給培里(譯註：共和黨籍德州州長)一個機會。只要共和黨選上總統，一定會開始暗地破壞那些運作良好的政府方案，不過屆時培里先生可能早忘了他該破壞哪些方案了。

[遊戲相關翻譯] 重裝武力3: BFE 製作者訪談

原文出處Blistered Thumbs

Sam不分紅海，他分的是城市

訪問過所有以重裝武力衍生的獨立製作遊戲後，是時候和重裝武力本家的開發者談談了。重裝武力：BFE 發售在即，Croteam的首席創意家(正式職稱)Davor Hunkski 百忙之中抽空參加面談，聊聊即將推出的新遊戲以及對製作衍生遊戲系列的靈感。

Question 1

就從告訴我們的讀者一些關於重裝武力: BFE 的新情報開始吧。

重裝武力3: BFE 使用我們自己的Serious Engine 3.5 製作。遊戲是重裝武力1的前傳，Sam “Serious” Stone在近未來的埃及對抗Mental 的侵略部隊。新作仍然緊緊擁抱以往重裝武力的精神：誇張華麗的動作場面、快節奏的單人戰役和多人遊戲，當然也少不了Sam那招牌的獨特幽默。

Question 2

重裝武力3: BFE 會是前傳。為何開發小組決定製作前傳呢？

我們想把走入時光機回到古埃及之前的劇情補完。先前我們就有設定，在更接近現代的埃及有場大戰，而Sam最終必須要回到古埃及去打倒Mental。因此我們打算深入這場戰役，讓重裝武力的粉絲能在熟悉的劇情設定下，體驗到不同以往的故事。

Question 3

我們有個工作人員承認自己從來沒玩過重裝武力系列。在用重裝武力1代的光碟扁了他好幾個小時後決定幫他問一下，這款對沒玩過系列作的新玩家好上手嗎？

怎麼可以沒有玩過重裝武力系列呢？實在是太失禮了！不過事實上，的確有一整個新世代的玩家從來沒玩過系列作，可是相信重裝武力HD版和重裝武力3: BFE的成功會讓我們得到更多的粉絲。

回到問題本身，不管玩家的遊戲經驗或是遊戲技巧如何，都可以輕鬆上手重裝武力3: BFE。重裝武力這種大型機台風格的射擊遊戲能在對抗模式中提供更加公平的場地，而我們的目標就是要讓遊戲過程單純順暢，所有人都可投入遊戲體驗混戰的樂趣。就只有玩家，一大堆的武器，還有準心而已。因此，任何人都可以在重裝武力3: BFE享受愉快的時光。

Question 4

遊戲是用與HD版相同的引擎開發，然而從預告看起來畫面卻好上幾萬倍。Serious 3 engine還可以發揮到什麼程度？

其實重裝武力3: BFE是用我們最新的Serious Engine 3.5開發的，HD版則是Serious Engine 3。Serious Engine 3.5是特別為重裝武力3: BFE打造的，讓我們得以設計出前所未見的動作等級。玩家會看到比以往更大、更精細的戰場，裡面塞滿了滿滿的敵人。說實話，遊戲尾聲的戰鬥會混亂到簡直難以想像。

GNNAR後悔問了Sam牠眼睛裡是不是有東西。

Question 5

重裝武力的敵人總是有些熟面孔。新作裡會有新的瘋狂怪物嗎？會有很多老班底敵人回歸嗎？

很多經典的敵人都會重現，像是無頭Kamikazes，Gnaar，Kleer，Biomechanoids。甚至有經典敵人的新變種還有Scrapjack 等全新怪物壯大Menta的軍團。

Question 6

也許還有更重要的問題，就是Sam的軍火有什麼改變？我喜歡來點新火力，可是如果拿走了我的加農砲，我可會不高興！

開心吧，因為大家最愛的加農砲仍舊健在！而加了爆裂彈的散彈槍肯定是受歡迎的改變。此外還有天狼星人的Mutilator…

Question 7

預告片裡有看到一把大槌子，這表示沒有電鋸囉？

因為電鋸沒油了，所以Sam改成揮舞一把閃亮的嶄新大槌，砸爛所有靠近到讓人不自在的敵人。有從頭揮下的垂直揮法，也可以水平揮舞來清理比較大批的敵軍，還有萬能的360度揮舞。

Question 8

重裝武力最棒的一點就是如果你實在沒辦法發射更多的子彈，可以找個朋友帶著火力一起來場合作派對。BFE會有哪些多人遊戲模式？

沒錯，合作模式和多人遊戲一直都是重裝武力的最大特色。重裝武力3: BFE的電腦版支援16名玩家的線上合作模式，還有多人對決模式裡最高可以支援4名玩家分割畫面遊戲。經典的遊戲如死鬥、搶旗也會加入在重裝武力HD新導入的模式，如Beast Hunt和持久戰。等不及看到各位上線發揮真本事了！

到處都是敵人，眼前卻沒有任何一塊矮牆可供遮掩。如臨至福。

Question 9

目前我們看到的場景都是Sam最愛的度假勝地埃及，他在這趟冒險中會旅行到其他地方嗎？

重裝武力3: BFE就只在埃及，不過因為設定在近未來而不是古代的埃及，玩家會用全新的眼光來看這些熟悉卻又新奇的場景。

Question 10

Sam從來就不是個慢慢來的傢伙，很高興得知遊戲並沒有使用掩護機制。可是要如何阻止人們躲在高度及胸的矮牆後呢？

只要玩家高興，他們可以躲在遊戲裡任何一個地方，但重裝武力不是這樣玩的。若想享受遊戲樂趣，就抓起武器，對著入侵的Meantal軍團來宣洩些怒氣。喔，如果真的想試著躲起來，最終敵人還是會摧毀所有牆壁與樑柱逮到你。

Question 11

撿起醫藥包和護甲？你確定現在的玩家還知道這些東西嗎？為什麼沒有採用自動回復血條呢？

自動回血真的拖慢了現在射擊遊戲的節奏。從壯決的交火中跑開，躲到附近的掩蔽物後跪下等回血有什麼樂趣？重裝武力的風格是快節奏、刺激火爆的動作，所以如果玩家被猛烈轟炸，我們要玩家手指緊扣板機然後狂奔向醫藥包或護甲。

Question 12

遊樂器的玩家也能玩到移植版的重裝武力3: BFE嗎？還是有專為遊樂器打造的版本？

重裝武力3: BFE最後會出遊樂器版。電腦版的遊戲正式啟動後會跟著推出。

圖中兩位玩家正在合作遊戲，想想16名玩家同時合作會有多酷！

Question 13

有款非常受歡迎的高檔遊戲不讓電腦玩家隨意更改畫面設定(Crysis 2)，BFE會讓玩家全權控制設定嗎？

是的，我們始終樂於讓重裝武力的粉絲全權更動畫面設定，重裝武力3: BFE亦是如此。

Question 14

還有更重要的一點，電腦版的玩家需要趕快添購新配備來跑重裝武力3: BFE嗎？能透露詳細配備嗎？

詳細配備很快就會更新於Steam的頁面上，不過不用擔心，我們希望遊戲能容易上手，所以大部分的人都不需要買台新電腦才能玩重裝武力3: BFE。

Question 15

製作小組用了嶄新方法宣傳BFE，任用了三個獨立製作小組來製作重裝武力的衍生遊戲。是誰提出這構想的？

這是我們的發行商Devolver 給Croteam 的意見，而我們真的愛死這點子了。由於我們本身也是獨立的製作小組，所以把這當成絕佳的機會，讓其他超棒的製作人能在重裝武力的世界裡，帶來並實現他們充滿創意的構想。

Question 16

你們有玩那些衍生遊戲嗎？目前評價如何？

有的，三款分別位於不同開發階段的遊戲我們都玩過了。全都非常出色充滿創意，相信重裝武力的粉絲一定會愛上的。每一款都呈現出獨特的重裝武力配方，展現出的結果讓我們開心不已。絕對要去看看他們喔！

Question 17

在未來有可能看到更多這類衍生遊戲嗎？會給製作團隊開發續作或是讓新制作團隊參與的權力嗎？

重裝武力的衍生遊戲系列讓我們非常開心，未來也絕對會繼續推出。其實已經有關於衍生遊戲第二系列的計畫了，所以獨立製作組們，別輕易轉台！

Question 18

最後，能給個遊戲確切上市日期嗎？

你應該很快就可以知道上市日期了，這點就讓我保留吧。

這可能會有點棘手...喔等等，Sam可以帶不只兩把槍！

[克魯曼專欄] Legends of the Fail 歐元破產傳奇 原文載於(2011/11/11)

原文出於NY TIMES



This is the way the euro ends — not with a bang but with bunga bunga. Not long ago, European leaders were insisting that Greece could and should stay on the euro while paying its debts in full. Now, with Italy falling off a cliff, it’s hard to see how the euro can survive at all.


歐元就是這樣終結的──不是轟然一聲結束，而是在領導人與眾多紅粉佳人的性醜聞下落幕。不久之前歐洲領導人還在堅持希臘會還清所有債務，所以希臘可以，而且也應該繼續留在歐元區。如今義大利也跌落深淵，實在看不出歐元還有一絲維持機會。


But what’s the meaning of the eurodebacle? As always happens when disaster strikes, there’s a rush by ideologues to claim that the disaster vindicates their views. So it’s time to start debunking.


然而歐元崩解意味著什麼？每當災難來臨，總是有群理論家會跳出來，聲稱這場災難證明了他們的觀點。是時候該揭穿真相了。


First things first: The attempt to create a common European currency was one of those ideas that cut across the usual ideological lines. It was cheered on by American right-wingers, who saw it as the next best thing to a revived gold standard, and by Britain’s left, which saw it as a big step toward a social-democratic Europe. But it was opposed by British conservatives, who also saw it as a step toward a social-democratic Europe. And it was questioned by American liberals, who worried — rightly, I’d say (but then I would, wouldn’t I?) — about what would happen if countries couldn’t use monetary and fiscal policy to fight recessions.


首先，試圖創造歐洲通用貨幣的構想已經超越了以往意識形態的分界。美國右派對此大為鼓勵，認為是僅次於回復金本位制外最好的想法；英國左派歡欣鼓舞，這是邁向社會民主主義歐洲的一大步。不過英國保守派抱持反對態度，因為也把此舉視為邁向社會民主主義歐洲的一大步；至於美國自由派亦提出質疑，擔憂──我會說擔憂的對(我的確是說了，不是嗎？) 如果國家不能使用貨幣與財政政策對抗不景氣該怎麼辦。


So now that the euro project is on the rocks, what lessons should we draw?


現在歐元方案瀕臨瓦解，我們從中學到了什麼教訓？


I’ve been hearing two claims, both false: that Europe’s woes reflect the failure of welfare states in general, and that Europe’s crisis makes the case for immediate fiscal austerity in the United States.


我聽過兩種說法，全部都是錯的。一個是說歐洲的災難反應福利國家的失敗，另一個說歐洲危機要美國立刻實施財政緊縮政策。


The assertion that Europe’s crisis proves that the welfare state doesn’t work comes from many Republicans. For example, Mitt Romney has accused President Obama of taking his inspiration from European “socialist democrats” and asserted that “Europe isn’t working in Europe.” The idea, presumably, is that the crisis countries are in trouble because they’re groaning under the burden of high government spending. But the facts say otherwise.


斷定歐洲危機證實福利國家會失敗主要來自共和黨人，比如說羅尼指控歐巴馬總統是受到歐洲「社會民主主義」所啟發，又聲稱「歐洲模式連在歐洲都沒有用。」其論述大概是身陷危機的國家，都被龐大的政府支出壓得喘不過氣。不過事實卻不是如此。


It’s true that all European countries have more generous social benefits — including universal health care — and higher government spending than America does. But the nations now in crisis don’t have bigger welfare states than the nations doing well — if anything, the correlation runs the other way. Sweden, with its famously high benefits, is a star performer, one of the few countries whose G.D.P. is now higher than it was before the crisis. Meanwhile, before the crisis, “social expenditure” — spending on welfare-state programs — was lower, as a percentage of national income, in all of the nations now in trouble than in Germany, let alone Sweden.


歐洲國家都有相當優渥的社會津貼──包含了全民健保，而且政府支出高於美國政府也是事實，但遭遇危機的國家並沒有比其他表現良好的國家有更高的津貼。真要說的話，關連性還完全相反。瑞典一向以高福利聞名，目前的表現卻非常耀眼，是少數幾個GDP比金融危機前還高的國家。此外陷入麻煩的國家在危機前，其社福支出(就是福利方案的支出)所占歲收比例還比德國低，更別提瑞典了。


Oh, and Canada, which has universal health care and much more generous aid to the poor than the United States, has weathered the crisis better than we have.


喔，還有加拿大，他們也有全民健保和比起美國更優渥的貧困補助，卻也比我們更順利的度過危機。


The euro crisis, then, says nothing about the sustainability of the welfare state. But does it make the case for belt-tightening in a depressed economy?


所以歐洲危機跟福利國家是否能持續毫無關係，但是否意味著經濟蕭條時要勒緊褲帶呢？


You hear that claim all the time. America, we’re told, had better slash spending right away or we’ll end up like Greece or Italy. Again, however, the facts tell a different story.


無時無刻都會聽到這種主張，說美國最好馬上大砍支出，或則會落得和希臘與義大利一樣的下場。然而再一次，事實不是這樣。


First, if you look around the world you see that the big determining factor for interest rates isn’t the level of government debt but whether a government borrows in its own currency. Japan is much more deeply in debt than Italy, but the interest rate on long-term Japanese bonds is only about 1 percent to Italy’s 7 percent. Britain’s fiscal prospects look worse than Spain’s, but Britain can borrow at just a bit over 2 percent, while Spain is paying almost 6 percent.


首先若環顧一下整個世界，會發現決定利率高低的巨大因素不是政府債務的等級，而是政府借了多少內債。日本的債務遠高於義大利，但日本長期國債的利率只有1%，而義大利是7%。英國的財政遠景看來比西班牙糟，可是英國借貸利率只高過2%一點點，西班牙卻幾乎到6%。


What has happened, it turns out, is that by going on the euro, Spain and Italy in effect reduced themselves to the status of third-world countries that have to borrow in someone else’s currency, with all the loss of flexibility that implies. In particular, since euro-area countries can’t print money even in an emergency, they’re subject to funding disruptions in a way that nations that kept their own currencies aren’t — and the result is what you see right now. America, which borrows in dollars, doesn’t have that problem.


結果證明由於採用歐元，西班牙和義大利等於把自己降到第三世界國家的水準，必須要借入他國的貨幣，喪失了貨幣彈性。此外歐元區國家連面臨危機也無法加印貨幣，因此受困於資金中斷，這是擁有自己貨幣的國家不會發生的，其結果就如現在所見。而美國是以美金借入，所以沒有此問題。


The other thing you need to know is that in the face of the current crisis, austerity has been a failure everywhere it has been tried: no country with significant debts has managed to slash its way back into the good graces of the financial markets. For example, Ireland is the good boy of Europe, having responded to its debt problems with savage austerity that has driven its unemployment rate to 14 percent. Yet the interest rate on Irish bonds is still above 8 percent — worse than Italy.


在目前危機當中還要知道一件事，就是所有嘗試財政緊縮的國家都失敗了：沒有一個有顯著負債的國家可以在大砍赤字後，回復了以往金融市場上的優雅身影。以愛爾蘭為例，愛爾蘭是歐洲的乖孩子，負責的以緊縮政策讓失業率飆到14%來處理債務問題，可是愛爾蘭國債利率還是超過8%，比義大利還高。


The moral of the story, then, is to beware of ideologues who are trying to hijack the European crisis on behalf of their agendas. If we listen to those ideologues, all we’ll end up doing is making our own problems — which are different from Europe’s, but arguably just as severe — even worse.


整件事的教訓，是小心那些為了自己利益方針試圖挾持歐洲危機的理論家。如果真的聽進了他們的理論，結果只會製造自己的麻煩──一個跟歐洲不同，但可能一樣嚴重甚至更糟糕的麻煩。

[克魯曼專欄] Here Comes the Sun 太陽出來囉 原文載於(2011/11/07)

原文出於NY Times

For decades the story of technology has been dominated, in the popular mind and to a large extent in reality, by computing and the things you can do with it. Moore’s Law — in which the price of computing power falls roughly 50 percent every 18 months — has powered an ever-expanding range of applications, from faxes to Facebook.

幾十年來電腦的廣泛使用使科技的故事始終位於主導地位，深深植於人心還有大部分的現實。根據摩爾定律，電腦運算能力的價格每18個月就會打對折，這讓電腦的運用來到前所未見的程度，從稅收到Facebook都是。

Our mastery of the material world, on the other hand, has advanced much more slowly. The sources of energy, the way we move stuff around, are much the same as they were a generation ago.

然而另一方面，我們支配物質世界的進度就慢了很多。如能源、運輸方式等都和上個世代相差無幾。

But that may be about to change. We are, or at least we should be, on the cusp of an energy transformation, driven by the rapidly falling cost of solar power. That’s right, solar power.

If that surprises you, if you still think of solar power as some kind of hippie fantasy, blame our fossilized political system, in which fossil fuel producers have both powerful political allies and a powerful propaganda machine that denigrates alternatives.

可是也許改變的時刻已經到了。我們已經，或是也該來到能源革新的關頭了，因為太陽能的價錢正快速大幅下滑。沒錯，就是太陽能。假如你對此感到驚訝，或者還是認為太陽能不過是嬉皮的幻想罷了，這要怪我們化石級的政治體系，因為石化燃料生產商既是強大的政治盟友也是強大的宣傳機器，不斷詆毀替代能源。

Speaking of propaganda: Before I get to solar, let’s talk briefly about hydraulic fracturing, a k a fracking.

說到宣傳，在討論太陽能之前，我們先來簡短地聊聊水力破裂法。

Fracking — injecting high-pressure fluid into rocks deep underground, inducing the release of fossil fuels — is an impressive technology. But it’s also a technology that imposes large costs on the public. We know that it produces toxic (and radioactive) wastewater that contaminates drinking water; there is reason to suspect, despite industry denials, that it also contaminates groundwater; and the heavy trucking required for fracking inflicts major damage on roads.

水力破裂法就是在地底岩層注入高壓水引起石化燃料釋出，非常令人印象深刻的科技，卻也讓大眾付出極大代價。目前已知在這過程內，會產生有毒而且具有放射性的廢水來汙染飲用水。雖然能源業否認，但也足以懷疑連帶污染了地下水。另外水力破裂法所需要的貨車運輸，也是道路毀損的主因。

Economics 101 tells us that an industry imposing large costs on third parties should be required to “internalize” those costs — that is, to pay for the damage it inflicts, treating that damage as a cost of production. Fracking might still be worth doing given those costs. But no industry should be held harmless from its impacts on the environment and the nation’s infrastructure.

基礎經濟學教我們，如果企業讓第三者付出了許多代價，就要把這些代價「內部化」。也就是說要賠償造成的損失，把傷害視為生產的成本。如果有人賠償這些損失，那水力破裂法是可以繼續的，可是不該有企業影響了環境和國家的基礎建設後，卻還能不用付出任何代價。

Yet what the industry and its defenders demand is, of course, precisely that it be let off the hook for the damage it causes. Why? Because we need that energy! For example, the industry-backed organization energyfromshale.org declares that “there are only two sides in the debate: those who want our oil and natural resources developed in a safe and responsible way; and those who don’t want our oil and natural gas resources developed at all.”

不過這些企業與其捍衛者理所當然的會為造成的損害開脫。為什麼呢？因為我們需要能源！舉例來說，有企業在背後撐腰的組織energyfromshale.org 宣稱「這場爭議只有兩方：一方希望石油與天然資源能安全合理的開發，另一方則根本不希望石油和天然資源有任何開發。」

So it’s worth pointing out that special treatment for fracking makes a mockery of free-market principles. Pro-fracking politicians claim to be against subsidies, yet letting an industry impose costs without paying compensation is in effect a huge subsidy. They say they oppose having the government “pick winners,” yet they demand special treatment for this industry precisely because they claim it will be a winner.

水力破裂法的特殊待遇根本是在嘲笑自由市場的準則，所以特別值得提出。贊成水力破裂法的政客聲稱反對任何補貼，但讓企業強徵公眾利益卻又不必付任何賠償金，其本身就是一個巨大的補助。政客反對政府來「挑選贏家」，與此同時又要求這行業要有特殊待遇，只因他們說這行業會是個贏家。

And now for something completely different: the success story you haven’t heard about.

現在來點徹底不同的故事，一個你還沒聽過的成功故事。

These days, mention solar power and you’ll probably hear cries of “Solyndra!” Republicans have tried to make the failed solar panel company both a symbol of government waste — although claims of a major scandal are nonsense — and a stick with which to beat renewable energy.

最近只要提到太陽能，可能會聽見有人大喊「Solyndra！(譯註：Solyndra為生產太陽能薄膜公司，曾接受美國聯邦補助，於今年9月1日宣布破產)」共和黨人試圖讓這家失敗的太陽能面板公司成為政府浪費的象徵──儘管基本上，聲稱這是起大醜聞是一派胡言，另外成為痛打可再生能源的棍子。

But Solyndra’s failure was actually caused by technological success: the price of solar panels is dropping fast, and Solyndra couldn’t keep up with the competition. In fact, progress in solar panels has been so dramatic and sustained that, as a blog post at Scientific American put it, “there’s now frequent talk of a ‘Moore’s law’ in solar energy,” with prices adjusted for inflation falling around 7 percent a year.

但是Solyndra的失敗其實是因為技術上的成功，太陽能面板的造價急遽下跌，而Solyndra在這場競爭裡跟不上腳步。事實上太陽能面板的發展是巨大且持續的進步，如科學人雜誌一篇部落格裡的文章所提，「現在太陽能裡也常提到摩爾定律」，價格每年都會下跌7%。

This has already led to rapid growth in solar installations, but even more change may be just around the corner. If the downward trend continues — and if anything it seems to be accelerating — we’re just a few years from the point at which electricity from solar panels becomes cheaper than electricity generated by burning coal.

太陽能板的安裝數量因此快速上升，不過更多的改變可能很快就會到來。如果降價的態勢持續不變，事實上目前看來降價的速度正不斷加快，只要再幾年太陽能發電的成本就會比燃燒煤油來的便宜。

And if we priced coal-fired power right, taking into account the huge health and other costs it imposes, it’s likely that we would already have passed that tipping point.

而且我們若把燃燒油煤的巨大健康與相關成本也算進去來收費，搞不好太陽能已經比較便宜了。

But will our political system delay the energy transformation now within reach?

然而我們的政治體系會延宕已經近在眼前的能源革新嗎？

Let’s face it: a large part of our political class, including essentially the entire G.O.P., is deeply invested in an energy sector dominated by fossil fuels, and actively hostile to alternatives. This political class will do everything it can to ensure subsidies for the extraction and use of fossil fuels, directly with taxpayers’ money and indirectly by letting the industry off the hook for environmental costs, while ridiculing technologies like solar.

面對事實吧，一大部分的政治階級包含幾乎整個共和黨，都在石化燃料壟斷的能源業投資了大筆金錢，所以十分敵視替代能源。這政治階級會用盡辦法確保補貼石化燃料的萃取與使用，直接點的拿納稅人的錢補貼，間接點的就讓企業開脫所造成的損害，同時嘲笑如太陽能之類的科技。

So what you need to know is that nothing you hear from these people is true. Fracking is not a dream come true; solar is now cost-effective. Here comes the sun, if we’re willing to let it in.

你要知道的就是這些人嘴裡講出來的全部是謊言。水力破裂法不是什麼美夢成真，而現在的太陽能已經符合效益。太陽出來了，就看我們願不願意打開那扇窗。

[克魯曼專欄] Oligarchy, American Style 寡頭政治，美國風格 (原文載於2012/11/04)

Inequality is back in the news, largely thanks to Occupy Wall Street, but with an assist from the Congressional Budget Office. And you know what that means: It’s time to roll out the obfuscators!

社會不平等又重回新聞版面上，大半要感謝占領華爾街的行動，還有美國國會預算處的協助。這表示是時候碾平那些混淆事實的人了！

Anyone who has tracked this issue over time knows what I mean. Whenever growing income disparities threaten to come into focus, a reliable set of defenders tries to bring back the blur. Think tanks put out reports claiming that inequality isn’t really rising, or that it doesn’t matter. Pundits try to put a more benign face on the phenomenon, claiming that it’s not really the wealthy few versus the rest, it’s the educated versus the less educated.

長期關注此議題的人會明白我的意思。每當收入增長不均的威脅浮上檯面，總是會有一群忠誠的捍衛者試著模糊焦點。智庫會提出報告，不是聲稱不平等並沒有攀升，就是說這一點也不重要。而專家則會擺出比較親切的面孔，宣稱其實不是少數富貴對抗普羅大眾，而是有受教育對抗比較沒受教育的人。

So what you need to know is that all of these claims are basically attempts to obscure the stark reality: We have a society in which money is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few people, and in which that concentration of income and wealth threatens to make us a democracy in name only.

要知道基本上，所有這些論點都是試圖遮掩赤裸裸的事實，我們的社會中增加的財富都是集中在少數人手上，而收入與財產的集中足以威脅民主，讓民主名存實亡。

The budget office laid out some of that stark reality in a recent report, which documented a sharp decline in the share of total income going to lower- and middle-income Americans. We still like to think of ourselves as a middle-class country. But with the bottom 80 percent of households now receiving less than half of total income, that’s a vision increasingly at odds with reality.

預算處最近的報告展現了這顯而易見的真相，美國中產階級與低收入戶的收入分配急劇下滑。我們還是喜歡自認為中產階級國家，可是當80%的家庭得不到總收入的一半時，印象與現實顯得越來越不一致。

In response, the usual suspects have rolled out some familiar arguments: the data are flawed (they aren’t); the rich are an ever-changing group (not so); and so on. The most popular argument right now seems, however, to be the claim that we may not be a middle-class society, but we’re still an upper-middle-class society, in which a broad class of highly educated workers, who have the skills to compete in the modern world, is doing very well.

為了回應，那些飽受嫌疑的人又開始提出再熟悉也不過的主張，如數據有瑕疵(並沒有)，富人階層是不斷替換的(並不是)之類。然而目前最為流行的說法，是聲稱我們或許不是中產階級社會，可是仍可稱為中上階級的社會。大量受過良好教育的勞工表現傑出，有本錢在現代世界中競爭。

It’s a nice story, and a lot less disturbing than the picture of a nation in which a much smaller group of rich people is becoming increasingly dominant. But it’s not true.

比起國內少數有錢人越來越占優勢的情況，這的確是個美好的故事，也比較沒那麼讓人心煩，但終究不是事實。

Workers with college degrees have indeed, on average, done better than workers without, and the gap has generally widened over time. But highly educated Americans have by no means been immune to income stagnation and growing economic insecurity. Wage gains for most college-educated workers have been unimpressive (and nonexistent since 2000), while even the well-educated can no longer count on getting jobs with good benefits. In particular, these days workers with a college degree but no further degrees are less likely to get workplace health coverage than workers with only a high school degree were in 1979.

平均來看，受過大學教育的勞工確實表現的比較出色，而這鴻溝正隨著時間逐漸拉開，可是受過高等教育的勞工也沒因此免於收入停滯及持續增長的經濟不安全感。大多大學畢業的勞工薪資實在不怎麼樣，而且從2000年後就已經沒有增加，甚至良好教育也不代表可以找到良好福利的工作。尤其現在大學學歷的勞工很少有工作場所保險，比1979年只有高中學歷的勞工還少。

So who is getting the big gains? A very small, wealthy minority.

那麼是誰大大的賺了一筆呢？非常稀少的有錢人。

The budget office report tells us that essentially all of the upward redistribution of income away from the bottom 80 percent has gone to the highest-income 1 percent of Americans. That is, the protesters who portray themselves as representing the interests of the 99 percent have it basically right, and the pundits solemnly assuring them that it’s really about education, not the gains of a small elite, have it completely wrong.

預算處的報告表明收入向上重新分配，遠離80%的民眾，流到了最高收入1%的美國人手中。所以那些示威者描述自己代表99%民眾利益基本上是對的，至於鄭重擔保問題出在教育，而不是少數菁英得益的專家錯得離譜。

If anything, the protesters are setting the cutoff too low. The recent budget office report doesn’t look inside the top 1 percent, but an earlier report, which only went up to 2005, found that almost two-thirds of the rising share of the top percentile in income actually went to the top 0.1 percent — the richest thousandth of Americans, who saw their real incomes rise more than 400 percent over the period from 1979 to 2005.

真要說有什麼不對，就是示威者把數字降太低了。雖然近年來預算處並沒有調查最高的1%，不過之前僅在2005年出版的報告發現，其實最高1%區間裡，收入有將近三分之二都屬於0.1%的人。從1979到2005年以來，千分之一的美國人實質所得增加了超過400%。

Who’s in that top 0.1 percent? Are they heroic entrepreneurs creating jobs? No, for the most part, they’re corporate executives. Recent research shows that around 60 percent of the top 0.1 percent either are executives in nonfinancial companies or make their money in finance, i.e., Wall Street broadly defined. Add in lawyers and people in real estate, and we’re talking about more than 70 percent of the lucky one-thousandth.

誰是那0.1%呢？是那些創造就業的偉大企業家嗎？不，他們大多是公司的高階主管。最近的研究顯示這群0.1%的人約有六成不是非金融公司的主管，就是在金融業賺錢。換句話說，就是在華爾街。再加上律師和不動產業，就是千分之一幸運兒裡的70%啦。

But why does this growing concentration of income and wealth in a few hands matter? Part of the answer is that rising inequality has meant a nation in which most families don’t share fully in economic growth. Another part of the answer is that once you realize just how much richer the rich have become, the argument that higher taxes on high incomes should be part of any long-run budget deal becomes a lot more compelling.

但收入集中在少數人有關係嗎？答案之一是持續升高的不均，意味著大部分家庭並沒有分享到經濟成長的果實。答案之二是一但了解這些富人有多富有，主張長期預算方案裡要對高收入階層增稅的說法就更有說服力。

The larger answer, however, is that extreme concentration of income is incompatible with real democracy. Can anyone seriously deny that our political system is being warped by the influence of big money, and that the warping is getting worse as the wealth of a few grows ever larger?

然而最重要的答案是收入極端的集中與現實的民主難以共存。有人可以鄭重否認我們的政治體系沒受到大把鈔票影響扭曲嗎？若這批人更加富有，情況不會更為惡化嗎？

Some pundits are still trying to dismiss concerns about rising inequality as somehow foolish. But the truth is that the whole nature of our society is at stake.

有些專家還是把不平等加劇當成愚蠢議題，事實是我們的社會已經來到危急關頭。



原文出於NY Times

[克魯曼專欄]Bombs, Bridges and Jobs 炸彈，大橋，工作 (2012/10/31)

A few years back Representative Barney Frank coined an apt phrase for many of his colleagues: weaponized Keynesians, defined as those who believe “that the government does not create jobs when it funds the building of bridges or important research or retrains workers, but when it builds airplanes that are never going to be used in combat, that is of course economic salvation.”

數年前眾議員法蘭克為他的同事取了個十分貼切的新名字：武裝派凱因斯信徒，其定義是「認為政府資助造橋鋪路、重要研究或是勞工進修等都無法創造就業，只有製造永不會用於戰爭的飛機才行。這可真是經濟救星。」

Right now the weaponized Keynesians are out in full force — which makes this a good time to see what’s really going on in debates over economic policy.

如今武裝派凱因斯信徒已蜂擁而出，這成了絕佳時機，讓我們得以一窺經濟政策辯論的真相。

What’s bringing out the military big spenders is the approaching deadline for the so-called supercommittee to agree on a plan for deficit reduction. If no agreement is reached, this failure is supposed to trigger cuts in the defense budget.

稱作超級委員會的委員會正討論是否同意削減赤字的方案，而隨著期限逐步逼近，那些主張龐大軍事支出的人紛紛現形，因為若沒達成協議，國防預算勢必會縮編。

Faced with this prospect, Republicans — who normally insist that the government can’t create jobs, and who have argued that lower, not higher, federal spending is the key to recovery — have rushed to oppose any cuts in military spending. Why? Because, they say, such cuts would destroy jobs.

面臨這種情形，通常堅定認為政府無法創造就業，而且聯邦支出應該要更低而非更高才是復甦關鍵的共和黨人，卻馬上反對刪減軍事開銷。為何呢？他們說因為刪減開銷會摧毀工作機會。

Thus Representative Buck McKeon, Republican of California, once attacked the Obama stimulus plan because “more spending is not what California or this country needs.” But two weeks ago, writing in The Wall Street Journal, Mr. McKeon — now the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee — warned that the defense cuts that are scheduled to take place if the supercommittee fails to agree would eliminate jobs and raise the unemployment rate.

還有，加州共和黨眾議員麥克基恩曾經砲轟過歐巴馬的刺激方案，他說「不管是加州還是整個國家都不需要更多支出。」然而就在兩星期前，這位麥克基恩先生才在華爾街日報上以眾院軍事委員會的身分警告，如果超級委員會沒能達成協議，國防預算的縮編會終結就業機會，讓失業率攀升。

Oh, the hypocrisy! But what makes this particular form of hypocrisy so enduring?

拜託，真是偽善。然而是什麼原因讓這奇異的偽善持續不斷？

First things first: Military spending does create jobs when the economy is depressed. Indeed, much of the evidence that Keynesian economics works comes from tracking the effects of past military buildups. Some liberals dislike this conclusion, but economics isn’t a morality play: spending on things you don’t like is still spending, and more spending would create more jobs.

首先，當經濟不景氣時軍事開銷真的可以創造就業。在追蹤以往建軍的效果後，許多證據都證明凱因斯經濟學在此真的管用。有些自由派人士不太喜歡這結論，但經濟不是道德遊戲。支出就是支出，不管是不是用在你喜歡的地方，而越多的支出可以創造越多的就業。

But why would anyone prefer spending on destruction to spending on construction, prefer building weapons to building bridges?

但為何有人喜歡把花費用於毀滅而不是創造，製造軍火而不是造橋鋪路呢？

John Maynard Keynes himself offered a partial answer 75 years ago, when he noted a curious “preference for wholly ‘wasteful’ forms of loan expenditure rather than for partly wasteful forms, which, because they are not wholly wasteful, tend to be judged on strict ‘business’ principles.” Indeed. Spend money on some useful goal, like the promotion of new energy sources, and people start screaming, “Solyndra! Waste!” Spend money on a weapons system we don’t need, and those voices are silent, because nobody expects F-22s to be a good business proposition.

凱因斯本人在75年前提供了部分的解答，他注意到很奇妙的一件事，「人們在借貸花費時傾向於完全而非部分揮霍掉，因為只花費部分容易被他人用嚴格的商業原則來檢視。」確實如此，花錢在一些有用的目標如宣傳新能源上，很快就會招來人們狂叫「沒有用！浪費！」可是把錢花在用不到的武器系統上就沒有這類意見，因為沒人認為F-22s會是什麼好商業提案。

To deal with this preference, Keynes whimsically suggested burying bottles full of cash in disused mines and letting the private sector dig them back up. In the same vein, I recently suggested that a fake threat of alien invasion, requiring vast anti-alien spending, might be just the thing to get the economy moving again.

為此凱因斯提出了異想天開的點子，建議把裝滿現金的瓶子放入廢棄礦坑內埋起來，再讓民間企業去開挖。同樣的道理，我提議假造有外星人入侵的威脅，需要大量對抗外星人的開銷，也許這樣可以讓經濟再次活絡起來。

But there are also darker motives behind weaponized Keynesianism.

然而武裝派凱因斯信徒背後有更深沉黑暗的動機。

For one thing, to admit that public spending on useful projects can create jobs is to admit that such spending can in fact do good, that sometimes government is the solution, not the problem. Fear that voters might reach the same conclusion is, I’d argue, the main reason the right has always seen Keynesian economics as a leftist doctrine, when it’s actually nothing of the sort. However, spending on useless or, even better, destructive projects doesn’t present conservatives with the same problem.

首先，承認公共支出用在有用的項目上可以創造就業，等於承認這些支出是好事，承認政府是解決問題，不是製造問題。我認為右派害怕選民也做出一樣結論，這就是為何右派始終把凱因斯經濟學視為左派學說，儘管根本就不是。然而話說回來，保守派在一些沒用，甚至毀滅性的項目上的花費就又沒這困擾。

Beyond that, there’s a point made long ago by the Polish economist Michael Kalecki: to admit that the government can create jobs is to reduce the perceived importance of business confidence.

除此之外，很久以前波蘭經濟學家卡列基就提出承認政府能創造就業，可以降低企業信心的重要性。

Appeals to confidence have always been a key debating point for opponents of taxes and regulation; Wall Street’s whining about President Obama is part of a long tradition in which wealthy businessmen and their flacks argue that any hint of populism on the part of politicians will upset people like them, and that this is bad for the economy. Once you concede that the government can act directly to create jobs, however, that whining loses much of its persuasive power — so Keynesian economics must be rejected, except in those cases where it’s being used to defend lucrative contracts.

對反對收稅與管制的人來說，凡事訴諸信心一直都是辯論中的關鍵。華爾街對歐巴馬總統嘀咕抱怨只是延續長久以來的傳統，一群大富商還有底下敲鑼打鼓的都認為，只要政客暗示了一點點民粹主義都會傷了他們的心，而且對經濟很不好。可是一但退一步承認政府可以有直接行動來創造就業，這些抱怨馬上就站不住腳。所以除非能用來保護有利可圖的合約，必須嚴厲拒絕凱因斯經濟學。

So I welcome the sudden upsurge in weaponized Keynesianism, which is revealing the reality behind our political debates. At a fundamental level, the opponents of any serious job-creation program know perfectly well that such a program would probably work, for the same reason that defense cuts would raise unemployment. But they don’t want voters to know what they know, because that would hurt their larger agenda — keeping regulation and taxes on the wealthy at bay.

因此我歡迎這些突然冒出的武裝派凱因斯信徒，他們正好揭露政治協商背後的真相。打從根本就反對任何創造就業計畫的人，其實非常明白這類計畫可能會有效果，正因如此才會說縮減國防預算會升高失業率。可是他們不想要選民知道自己明白其道理，因為這會讓他們更遠大的目標受阻，那目標就是要讓富人遠離稅收與管制。






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